Difference between revisions of "Testing for Vulnerable Remember Password and Pwd Reset (OWASP-AT-006)"

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== Brief Summary ==
 
== Brief Summary ==
Several web applications allow users to reset their password if they have forgotten it, usually by sending them a password reset email and/or by asking them to answer one or more "security questions". In this test, we check that this function is properly implemented and that it does not introduce any flaw in the authentication scheme. We also check whether the application allows the user to store the password in the browser ("remember password" function).
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Most web applications allow users to reset their password if they have forgotten it, usually by sending them a password reset email and/or by asking them to answer one or more "security questions." In this test, we check that this function is properly implemented and that it does not introduce any flaw in the authentication scheme. We also check whether the application allows the user to store the password in the browser ("remember password" function).
 
<br>
 
<br>
  
 
== Description of the Issue ==  
 
== Description of the Issue ==  
A great majority of web applications provide a way for users to recover (or reset) their password in case they have forgotten it. The exact procedure varies heavily among different applications, also depending on the required level of security, but the approach is always to use an alternate way of verifying the identity of the user. One of the simplest (and most common) approaches is to ask the user for his/her e-mail address, and send the old password (or a new one) to that address. This scheme is based on the assumption that the user's email has not been compromised and that is secure enough for this goal.<br>
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A great majority of web applications provide a way for users to recover (or reset) their password in case they have forgotten it. The exact procedure varies heavily among different applications, also depending on the required level of security, but the approach is always to use an alternate way of verifying the identity of the user. One of the simplest (and most common) approaches is to have on file the user's email address (e.g., this is obtained when the user first registers), and send the old password (or a new one) to that address. This scheme is based on the assumption that the user's email has not been compromised and that is secure enough for this goal.<br>
 
Alternatively (or in addition to that), the application could ask the user to answer one or more "secret questions", which are usually chosen by the user among a set of possible ones. The security of this scheme lies in the ability to provide a way for someone to identify themselves to the system with answers to questions that are not easily answerable via personal information lookups. As an example, a very insecure question would be “your mother’s maiden name” since that is a piece of information that an attacker could find out without much effort.  An example of a better question would be “favorite grade-school teacher” since this would be a much more difficult topic to research about a person whose identity may otherwise already be stolen.
 
Alternatively (or in addition to that), the application could ask the user to answer one or more "secret questions", which are usually chosen by the user among a set of possible ones. The security of this scheme lies in the ability to provide a way for someone to identify themselves to the system with answers to questions that are not easily answerable via personal information lookups. As an example, a very insecure question would be “your mother’s maiden name” since that is a piece of information that an attacker could find out without much effort.  An example of a better question would be “favorite grade-school teacher” since this would be a much more difficult topic to research about a person whose identity may otherwise already be stolen.
 
<br>
 
<br>
Another common feature that applications use to provide users a convenience, is to cache the password locally in the browser (on the client machine) and having it 'pre-typed' in all subsequent accesses. While this feature can be perceived as extremely friendly for the average user, at the same time it introduces a flaw, as the user account becomes easily accessible to anyone that uses the same machine account.<br>
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Another common feature that applications use to provide users a convenience is to cache the password locally in the browser (on the client machine) and having it 'pre-typed' in all subsequent accesses. While this feature can be perceived as extremely friendly for the average user, at the same time, it introduces a flaw, as the user account becomes easily accessible to anyone that uses the same account on the client machine.<br>
  
 
==Black Box Testing and Examples==
 
==Black Box Testing and Examples==
  
 
'''Password Reset''' <br>
 
'''Password Reset''' <br>
The first step is to check whether secret questions are used. Sending the password (or a password reset link) to the user email address without first asking for a secret question means relying 100% on the security of that email address, which is not suitable if the applicaton needs a high level of security.<br>
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The first step is to check whether secret questions are used. Sending the password (or a password reset link) to the user email address without first asking for a secret question means relying 100% on the security of that email address, which is not suitable if the application needs a high level of security.<br>
On the other hand, if secret question are used, the next step is to assessing their strength.<br>As a first point, how many questions need to be answered before the password can be reset ? The majority of applications only need the user to answer to one question, but some critical applications require the user to answer correctly to two or even more different questions.<br>
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On the other hand, if secret questions are used, the next step is to assess their strength.<br>As a first point, how many questions need to be answered before the password can be reset? The majority of applications only need the user to answer to one question, but some critical applications require the user to answer correctly to two or even more questions.<br>
As a second step, we need to analyze the questions themselves. Often a self-reset system offers the choice of multiple questions; this is a good sign for the would-be attacker as this presents him/her with options. Ask yourself whether you could obtain answers to any or all of these questions via a simple Google search on the Internet or with some social engineering attack. As a penetration tester, here is a step-by-step walk through of assessing a password self-reset tool:
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As a second step, we need to analyze the questions themselves. Often a self-reset system offers the choice of multiple questions; this is a good sign for the would-be attacker as this presents him/her with options. Ask yourself whether you could obtain answers to any or all of these questions via a simple Google search on the Internet or with a social engineering attack. As a penetration tester, here is a step-by-step walk-through of assessing a password self-reset tool:
  
 
* Are there multiple questions offered?
 
* Are there multiple questions offered?
 
** If so, try to pick a question which would have a “public” answer; for example, something Google would find with a simple query
 
** If so, try to pick a question which would have a “public” answer; for example, something Google would find with a simple query
 
** Always pick questions which have a factual answer such as a “first school” or other facts which can be looked up
 
** Always pick questions which have a factual answer such as a “first school” or other facts which can be looked up
** Look for questions which have few possible options such as “what make was your first car”; this question would present the attacker with a short-list of answers to guess at and based on statistics the attacker could rank answers from most to least likely
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** Look for questions which have few possible options, such as “what make was your first car”. These questions would present the attacker with a short-list of answers to guess at and based on statistics the attacker could rank answers from most to least likely
 
* Determine how many guesses you have (if possible)
 
* Determine how many guesses you have (if possible)
** Does the password reset allow unlimited attempts ?
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** Does the password reset allow unlimited attempts?
** Is there a lockout period after X incorrect answers? Keep in mind that a lockout system can be a security problem in itself, as it can be exploited by an attacker to launch a Denial of Service against users
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** Is there a lockout period after X incorrect answers? Keep in mind that a lockout system can be a security problem in itself, as it can be exploited by an attacker to launch a Denial of Service against legitimate users
 
* Pick the appropriate question based on analysis from above point, and do research to determine the most likely answers
 
* Pick the appropriate question based on analysis from above point, and do research to determine the most likely answers
 
* How does the password-reset tool (once a successful answer to a question is found) behave?
 
* How does the password-reset tool (once a successful answer to a question is found) behave?
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** The most insecure scenario here is if the password reset tool shows you the password; this gives the attacker the ability to log into the account, and unless the application provides information about the last login the victim would not know that his/her account has been compromised.
 
** The most insecure scenario here is if the password reset tool shows you the password; this gives the attacker the ability to log into the account, and unless the application provides information about the last login the victim would not know that his/her account has been compromised.
 
** A less insecure scenario is if the password reset tool forces the user to immediately change his/her password. While not as stealthy as the first case, it allows the attacker to gain access and locks the real user out.
 
** A less insecure scenario is if the password reset tool forces the user to immediately change his/her password. While not as stealthy as the first case, it allows the attacker to gain access and locks the real user out.
** The best security is achieved if the password reset is done via an email to the address the user initially registered with, or some other email address; this forces the attacker to not only guess at which email account the password reset was sent to (unless the application tells that) but also to compromise that account in order to take control of the victim access to the application.
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** The best security is achieved if the password reset is done via an email to the address the user initially registered with, or some other email address; this forces the attacker to not only guess at which email account the password reset was sent to (unless the application tells that) but also to compromise that account in order to take control of the victim's access to the application.
 
<br>
 
<br>
 
The key to successfully exploiting and bypassing a password self-reset is to find a question or set of questions which give the possibility of easily acquiring the answers.  Always look for questions which can give you the greatest statistical chance of guessing the correct answer, if you are completely unsure of any of the answers.  In the end, a password self-reset tool is only as strong as the weakest question.
 
The key to successfully exploiting and bypassing a password self-reset is to find a question or set of questions which give the possibility of easily acquiring the answers.  Always look for questions which can give you the greatest statistical chance of guessing the correct answer, if you are completely unsure of any of the answers.  In the end, a password self-reset tool is only as strong as the weakest question.
As a side note, if the application sends/visualizes the old password in cleartext it means that passwords are not stored in a hashed form, which is a security issue in itself already.  
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As a side note, if the application sends/visualizes the old password in cleartext it means that passwords are not stored in a hashed form, which is a security issue in itself.  
 
<br><br>
 
<br><br>
 
'''Password Remember'''<br>
 
'''Password Remember'''<br>
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The "remember my password" mechanism can be implemented with one of the following methods:
 
The "remember my password" mechanism can be implemented with one of the following methods:
 
# Allowing the "cache password" feature in web browsers. Although not directly an application mechanism, this can and should be disabled.
 
# Allowing the "cache password" feature in web browsers. Although not directly an application mechanism, this can and should be disabled.
# Storing the password in a permanent cookie. The password must be hashed/encrypted and not sent in cleartext.
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# Storing the password in a permanent cookie. The password must be hashed/encrypted and not sent in the clear.
  
 
For the first method, check the HTML code of the login page to see whether browser caching of the passwords is disabled. The code for this will usually be along the following lines:
 
For the first method, check the HTML code of the login page to see whether browser caching of the passwords is disabled. The code for this will usually be along the following lines:
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</pre>
 
</pre>
 
The password autocomplete should always be disabled, especially in sensitive applications, since an attacker, if able to access the browser cache, could easily obtain the password in cleartext (public computers are a very notable example of this attack).
 
The password autocomplete should always be disabled, especially in sensitive applications, since an attacker, if able to access the browser cache, could easily obtain the password in cleartext (public computers are a very notable example of this attack).
To check the second implementation type examine the cookie stored by the application. Verify the credentials are not stored in cleartext, but are hashed. Examine the hashing mechanism: if it appears a common well-known one, check for its strength; in homegrown hash functions, attempt several usernames to check whether the hash function is easily guessable. Additionally, verify that the credentials are only sent during the login phase, and not sent together with every request to the application.  
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To check the second implementation type, examine the cookies stored by the application. Verify that the credentials are not stored in cleartext, but are hashed. Examine the hashing mechanism: if it is a common, well-known algorithm, check for its strength; in homegrown hash functions, attempt several usernames to check whether the hash function is easily guessable. Additionally, verify that the credentials are only sent during the login phase, and not sent together with every request to the application.  
 
<br>
 
<br>
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==Gray Box Testing and Examples==
 
==Gray Box Testing and Examples==
This test uses only functional features of the application and HTML code that is always available to the client, the graybox testing follows the same guidelines of the previous paragraph. The only exception is for the password encoded in the cookie, where the same gray box analysis described in the [[Cookie and Session Token Manipulation AoC]] chapter can be applied
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This test uses only functional features of the application and HTML code that is always available to the client, the graybox testing follows the same guidelines of the previous section. The only exception is for the password encoded in the cookie, where the same gray box analysis described in the [[Testing_for_Session_Management_Schema (OWASP-SM-001)|Testing for Session Management Schema]] chapter can be applied.
 
<br><br>
 
<br><br>
{{Category:OWASP Testing Project AoC}}
 
[[OWASP Testing Guide v2 Table of Contents]]
 

Revision as of 13:30, 27 May 2009

OWASP Testing Guide v3 Table of Contents

This article is part of the OWASP Testing Guide v3. The entire OWASP Testing Guide v3 can be downloaded here.

OWASP at the moment is working at the OWASP Testing Guide v4: you can browse the Guide here

Contents


Brief Summary

Most web applications allow users to reset their password if they have forgotten it, usually by sending them a password reset email and/or by asking them to answer one or more "security questions." In this test, we check that this function is properly implemented and that it does not introduce any flaw in the authentication scheme. We also check whether the application allows the user to store the password in the browser ("remember password" function).

Description of the Issue

A great majority of web applications provide a way for users to recover (or reset) their password in case they have forgotten it. The exact procedure varies heavily among different applications, also depending on the required level of security, but the approach is always to use an alternate way of verifying the identity of the user. One of the simplest (and most common) approaches is to have on file the user's email address (e.g., this is obtained when the user first registers), and send the old password (or a new one) to that address. This scheme is based on the assumption that the user's email has not been compromised and that is secure enough for this goal.
Alternatively (or in addition to that), the application could ask the user to answer one or more "secret questions", which are usually chosen by the user among a set of possible ones. The security of this scheme lies in the ability to provide a way for someone to identify themselves to the system with answers to questions that are not easily answerable via personal information lookups. As an example, a very insecure question would be “your mother’s maiden name” since that is a piece of information that an attacker could find out without much effort. An example of a better question would be “favorite grade-school teacher” since this would be a much more difficult topic to research about a person whose identity may otherwise already be stolen.
Another common feature that applications use to provide users a convenience is to cache the password locally in the browser (on the client machine) and having it 'pre-typed' in all subsequent accesses. While this feature can be perceived as extremely friendly for the average user, at the same time, it introduces a flaw, as the user account becomes easily accessible to anyone that uses the same account on the client machine.

Black Box Testing and Examples

Password Reset
The first step is to check whether secret questions are used. Sending the password (or a password reset link) to the user email address without first asking for a secret question means relying 100% on the security of that email address, which is not suitable if the application needs a high level of security.
On the other hand, if secret questions are used, the next step is to assess their strength.
As a first point, how many questions need to be answered before the password can be reset? The majority of applications only need the user to answer to one question, but some critical applications require the user to answer correctly to two or even more questions.
As a second step, we need to analyze the questions themselves. Often a self-reset system offers the choice of multiple questions; this is a good sign for the would-be attacker as this presents him/her with options. Ask yourself whether you could obtain answers to any or all of these questions via a simple Google search on the Internet or with a social engineering attack. As a penetration tester, here is a step-by-step walk-through of assessing a password self-reset tool:

  • Are there multiple questions offered?
    • If so, try to pick a question which would have a “public” answer; for example, something Google would find with a simple query
    • Always pick questions which have a factual answer such as a “first school” or other facts which can be looked up
    • Look for questions which have few possible options, such as “what make was your first car”. These questions would present the attacker with a short-list of answers to guess at and based on statistics the attacker could rank answers from most to least likely
  • Determine how many guesses you have (if possible)
    • Does the password reset allow unlimited attempts?
    • Is there a lockout period after X incorrect answers? Keep in mind that a lockout system can be a security problem in itself, as it can be exploited by an attacker to launch a Denial of Service against legitimate users
  • Pick the appropriate question based on analysis from above point, and do research to determine the most likely answers
  • How does the password-reset tool (once a successful answer to a question is found) behave?
    • Does it allow immediate change of the password?
    • Does it display the old password?
    • Does it email the password to some pre-defined email address?
    • The most insecure scenario here is if the password reset tool shows you the password; this gives the attacker the ability to log into the account, and unless the application provides information about the last login the victim would not know that his/her account has been compromised.
    • A less insecure scenario is if the password reset tool forces the user to immediately change his/her password. While not as stealthy as the first case, it allows the attacker to gain access and locks the real user out.
    • The best security is achieved if the password reset is done via an email to the address the user initially registered with, or some other email address; this forces the attacker to not only guess at which email account the password reset was sent to (unless the application tells that) but also to compromise that account in order to take control of the victim's access to the application.


The key to successfully exploiting and bypassing a password self-reset is to find a question or set of questions which give the possibility of easily acquiring the answers. Always look for questions which can give you the greatest statistical chance of guessing the correct answer, if you are completely unsure of any of the answers. In the end, a password self-reset tool is only as strong as the weakest question. As a side note, if the application sends/visualizes the old password in cleartext it means that passwords are not stored in a hashed form, which is a security issue in itself.

Password Remember

The "remember my password" mechanism can be implemented with one of the following methods:

  1. Allowing the "cache password" feature in web browsers. Although not directly an application mechanism, this can and should be disabled.
  2. Storing the password in a permanent cookie. The password must be hashed/encrypted and not sent in the clear.

For the first method, check the HTML code of the login page to see whether browser caching of the passwords is disabled. The code for this will usually be along the following lines:

<INPUT TYPE="password" AUTOCOMPLETE="off">

The password autocomplete should always be disabled, especially in sensitive applications, since an attacker, if able to access the browser cache, could easily obtain the password in cleartext (public computers are a very notable example of this attack). To check the second implementation type, examine the cookies stored by the application. Verify that the credentials are not stored in cleartext, but are hashed. Examine the hashing mechanism: if it is a common, well-known algorithm, check for its strength; in homegrown hash functions, attempt several usernames to check whether the hash function is easily guessable. Additionally, verify that the credentials are only sent during the login phase, and not sent together with every request to the application.

Gray Box Testing and Examples

This test uses only functional features of the application and HTML code that is always available to the client, the graybox testing follows the same guidelines of the previous section. The only exception is for the password encoded in the cookie, where the same gray box analysis described in the Testing for Session Management Schema chapter can be applied.