Difference between revisions of "OWASP Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities - Insufficient Password Recovery"

From OWASP
Jump to: navigation, search
(Created page with "Return to Periodic Table Working View == Insufficient Password Recovery == === Root Cause Summa...")
 
 
Line 29: Line 29:
  
 
While the user is authenticating via one of the above methods, the following security principles should be applied:
 
While the user is authenticating via one of the above methods, the following security principles should be applied:
 +
* The reset flow should never send an actual password to the user at any time over any channel
 
* The reset form should not expose an account enumeration vulnerability:
 
* The reset form should not expose an account enumeration vulnerability:
 
** Token-based reset forms should claim to have sent the token whether the account exists or not.
 
** Token-based reset forms should claim to have sent the token whether the account exists or not.

Latest revision as of 15:46, 15 May 2013

Return to Periodic Table Working View

Contents

Insufficient Password Recovery

Root Cause Summary

Weak password recovery processes allow stronger password authentication schemes to be bypassed. Non-existent password recovery processes are expensive to support or result in denial-of-service conditions.

Browser / Standards Solution

None

Perimeter Solution

None

Generic Framework Solution

The framework should provide all of the following configurable options, and require at least one of them for self-service password resets:

  • Security questions
    • Require a minimum of three different questions
    • Support configuration-based, pre-defined questions as well as user-defined questions
    • Store answers for each user according to the same security requirements as passwords (hashed with salt)
  • Email reset
    • Application emails a password reset link with an expiring nonce to the email address on file
  • SMS reset
    • Application sends an alphanumeric token to the cell phone number on file
    • The application redirects the user to a form where the token must be entered

While the user is authenticating via one of the above methods, the following security principles should be applied:

  • The reset flow should never send an actual password to the user at any time over any channel
  • The reset form should not expose an account enumeration vulnerability:
    • Token-based reset forms should claim to have sent the token whether the account exists or not.
    • Secret-question-based reset forms should ask random questions (seeded with the user id so they are the same each time) if the account does not exist.
  • Reset tokens should only be valid for a short period of time (<24 hours, configurable).
  • Only the most recent reset token should be valid at any given time.
  • The reset form should only be usable for a given account once during any given time period (~24 hours, configurable) in order to prevent denial-of-service, SMS/email bombing, and circumvention of password history rules.
  • The reset token should be invalidated as soon as it is used.
  • The current password should be valid until a successful reset is complete (also limits denial-of-service).
  • All existing sessions for the user should be automatically terminated when a successful reset is complete.

Once the user successfully completes the alternate channel authentication, the framework should prompt for a new password to be entered twice, to ensure it is correct. The user should be notified via email or some other method whenever a successful password change takes place.

Custom Framework Solution

None

Custom Code Solution

None

Discussion / Controversy

Secret questions are fairly controversial. Email/SMS side-channel authentication is preferred.

References

OWASP Forgot Password Cheat Sheet
OWASP Security Questions Cheat Sheet
Insufficient Password Recovery (WASC)