Difference between revisions of "OWASP Good Component Practices Project"

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If self-assurance is not included in the tooling, the process is very easy to subvert. If the delivery tools themselves don't allow the subversion of the policies, and you can actually  inspect the process, then it can be asked, "Was this tool chain used?" If the answer is "Yes, the tool chain was used", it can then be asserted that the only way for this component to get deployed is through the policies built within the tool." It is no longer left up to the discretion of individual developers to manage component vulnerabilities.
 
If self-assurance is not included in the tooling, the process is very easy to subvert. If the delivery tools themselves don't allow the subversion of the policies, and you can actually  inspect the process, then it can be asked, "Was this tool chain used?" If the answer is "Yes, the tool chain was used", it can then be asserted that the only way for this component to get deployed is through the policies built within the tool." It is no longer left up to the discretion of individual developers to manage component vulnerabilities.
  
In this project, we will examine three gateways of component vulnerability and establish a series of best practices for managing component. The output of the project will be a set of best practices for managing and monitoring open source components as part of the complete component life cycle.  
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In this project, we will examine three gateways of component vulnerability and establish a series of best practices for managing component security. The output of the project will be a set of best practices for managing and monitoring open source components as part of the complete component life cycle.  
  
 
= Gateways of Component Vulnerability =
 
= Gateways of Component Vulnerability =

Revision as of 14:44, 25 April 2013

Contents

GCP Project Overview

This project documents a set of best practices for managing open source component vulnerability within enterprise applications. Fundamentally, we are concerned with usage throughout the entire component life cycle, from the time a component is selected for inclusion within the application through its deployment and maintenance within the production environment.

The underlying premise of this project is that the application itself should be part of the assurance process. Application self assurance needs to ensure that the "things" being placed into the system are not introducing new risks. Automated vulnerability discovery must be part of any continuous delivery process. If self-assurance and automated monitoring are not integrated into the entire life cycle of the component/application relationship, it is virtually impossible to assure the security of the system.

The notion of component life cycle management (CLM) has to be part of the delivery mechanism. Manual inspection after the fact as to whether a component puts the application or system at risk is no longer adequate, if it ever was. CLM has to be part of the software development process. Detection and monitoring have to be integrated into software delivery, itself.

When managing applications at enterprise scale, manual processes documented on a piece of paper or spreadsheet are not adequate. A system with 25,000 open source components must have self-assurance built into the tooling and development process. The tool itself says "I'm going to deploy this version. This version has been checked and I want to deploy it." The tool should be able to assert that all of the components that are part of that delivery mechanism have the characteristics necessary to meet the (enterprise) policy for that deployment to that type of infrastructure.

If self-assurance is not included in the tooling, the process is very easy to subvert. If the delivery tools themselves don't allow the subversion of the policies, and you can actually inspect the process, then it can be asked, "Was this tool chain used?" If the answer is "Yes, the tool chain was used", it can then be asserted that the only way for this component to get deployed is through the policies built within the tool." It is no longer left up to the discretion of individual developers to manage component vulnerabilities.

In this project, we will examine three gateways of component vulnerability and establish a series of best practices for managing component security. The output of the project will be a set of best practices for managing and monitoring open source components as part of the complete component life cycle.

Gateways of Component Vulnerability

There are three gateways at which a vulnerable component may be included within an application: Selection/Consumption, Integration, Deployment. Each of these gateways must be policed and monitored to block, eliminate or manage vulnerable components. In this section, we describe the three gateways.

Consumption: Selection of the components and where they came from (provenance)

The first gateway of entrance to monitor for risk management is provenance - where does the componenent come from from. There are three levels of risk to examine at first gateway:

  -- Licensing
  -- Security
  -- Quality

There must be a way to verify that the component downloaded is actually the component selected.

Once the component has crossed through the first gate, it becomes part of the development environment with other risk types

Integration: Component management within the development environment

Is the component I'm using actually what I have downloaded. How do I know that what I originally said was "ok" is actually what is being used? A simplified scenario for a downloaded file is:

I download a file and virus scan it on my machine.
The virus scan says it is clean so I put it in my local file directory.
At some later point in time, I use the file that I downloaded.
How do I insure that the thing that I downloaded is still what I thought it was?
How do I know the name wasn't changed, or the contents of the file haven't been altered?

The same is true for components. What kind of assurance can be made that the component has not been altered once it enters into the development environment.

Deployment: Component maintenance within the production environment

When the component moves into production, how do I ensure that what is actually running is the same thing that the developer that it was. How do I ensure that all along the path from selection through deployment, that the component is actually what I think it is. How do I verify that nothing has changed.

The gateways where risk can get introduced are the main points for automated monitoring and enforcement of policies and procedures. If I do all that great work up front, (this is validate, confirm integration with my current environment, etc,) then I need to ensure that that the component that was approved doesn't get invalidated by misconfiguration or manual change of version numbers to work around company policies.

Validation must be done through ever step in the supply chain to confirm that the component in use is what it says it is and hasn't been changed during the process.


Mark Miller 22:04, 24 April 2013 (UTC)

Outline for Good Component Practices

Component Selection

  • Set standards and policy for component usage
  • Identify components needed

Integration into Development Environment

  • Verify company compliance policies

Integration and Maintenance within Production Environment

  • Automated inventory of existing components, libraries and frameworks
  • Monitor usage of deployed components
  • Update risky components
  • Move beyond penetration testing to find vulnerable components

Detailed Framework for Good Component Practices

Component Selection

  • Set standards and policy for component usage
    • Components must be actively maintained
    • Component projects must have a security contact and security announcement list
    • Component projects must use security tools and make the results public
    • Component projects must have a history of responding to security vulnerability reports in a timely manner
    • Component binaries must be generated directly from project source code using trusted tools
    • Components with known vulnerabilities must be removed or updated within 1 month of vulnerability announcement

Integration into Development Environment

Integration and Maintenance within Production Environment

Project About

PROJECT INFO
What does this OWASP project offer you?
RELEASE(S) INFO
What releases are available for this project?
what is this project?
Name: OWASP Good Component Practices Project (home page)
Purpose: Good Component Practice is one of the most over looked silver bullets in the Open Source arsenal. Because of business pressure, we have found that companies are willing to risk using unverified open source components, trading off security for enhanced speed in development.

This project will use community input to document an industry acceptable process for the creation, maintenance and use of open source components.

License: Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 3.0 License (best for documentation projects)
who is working on this project?
Project Leader(s):
  • Mark Miller @
Project Contributor(s):
  • Trusted Software Alliance
  • Sonatype
how can you learn more?
Project Pamphlet: Not Yet Created
Project Presentation:
Mailing list: Mailing List Archives
Project Roadmap: View
Key Contacts
  • Contact Mark Miller @ to contribute to this project
  • Contact Mark Miller @ to review or sponsor this project
  • Contact the GPC to report a problem or concern about this project or to update information.
current release
Not Yet Published
last reviewed release
Not Yet Reviewed


other releases