Difference between revisions of "Key exchange without entity authentication"

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[[ASDR_TOC_Vulnerabilities|Vulnerabilities Table of Contents]]
  
==Overview==
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==Description==
  
 
Performing a key exchange without verifying the identity of the entity being communicated with will preserve the integrity of the information sent between the two entities; this will not, however, guarantee the identity of end entity.
 
Performing a key exchange without verifying the identity of the entity being communicated with will preserve the integrity of the information sent between the two entities; this will not, however, guarantee the identity of end entity.
  
==Consequences ==
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'''Consequences'''
  
* Authentication: No authentication takes place in this process, bypassing an assumed protection of encryption
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* Authentication: No authentication takes place in this process, bypassing an assumed protection of encryption
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* Confidentiality: The encrypted communication between a user and a trusted host may be subject to a "man-in-the-middle" sniffing attack
  
* Confidentiality: The encrypted communication between a user and a trusted host may be subject to a "man-in-the-middle" sniffing attack
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'''Exposure period'''
  
==Exposure period ==
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* Design: Proper authentication should be included in the system design.
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* Design: Use a language which provides an interface to safely handle this exchange.
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* Implementation: If use of SSL (or similar) is simply mandated by design and requirements, it is the implementor's job to properly use the API and all its protections.
  
* Design: Proper authentication should be included in the system design.
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'''Platform'''
  
* Design: Use a language which provides an interface to safely handle this exchange.
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* Languages: Any language which does not provide a framework for key exchange.
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* Operating platforms: All
  
* Implementation: If use of SSL (or similar) is simply mandated by design and requirements, it is the implementor's job to properly use the API and all its protections.
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'''Required resources'''
  
==Platform ==
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Any
  
* Languages: Any language which does not provide a framework for key exchange.
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'''Severity'''
  
* Operating platforms: All
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High
  
==Required resources ==
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'''Likelihood of exploit'''
  
Any
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High
  
==Severity ==
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Key exchange without entity authentication may lead to a set of attacks known as "man-in-the-middle" attacks. These attacks take place through the impersonation of a trusted server by a malicious server. If the user skips or ignores the failure of authentication, the server may request authentication information from the user and then use this information with the true server to either sniff the legitimate traffic between the user and host or simply to log in manually with the user's credentials.
  
High
 
  
==Likelihood  of exploit ==
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==Risk Factors==
  
High
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TBD
  
==Avoidance and mitigation ==
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==Examples==
  
* Design: Ensure that proper authentication is included in the system design.
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Many systems have used Diffie-Hellman key exchange without authenticating the entities exchanging keys, leading to man-in-the-middle attacks. Many people using SSL/TLS skip the authentication (often unknowingly).
  
* Implementation: Understand and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the identity of entities involved in encrypted communications.
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==Related [[Attacks]]==
  
==Discussion ==
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* [[Man-in-the-middle attack]]
  
Key exchange without entity authentication may lead to a set of attacks known as "man-in-the-middle" attacks. These attacks take place through the impersonation of a trusted server by a malicious server. If the user skips or ignores the failure of authentication, the server may request authentication information from the user and then use this information with the true server to either sniff the legitimate traffic between the user and host or simply to log in manually with the user's credentials.
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==Related [[Vulnerabilities]]==
  
==Examples ==
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* [[Failure to follow chain of trust in certificate validation]]
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* [[Failure to validate host-specific certificate data]]
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* [[Failure to validate certificate expiration]]
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* [[Failure to check for certificate revocation]]
  
Many systems have used Diffie-Hellman key exchange without authenticating the entities exchanging keys, leading to man-in-the-middle attacks. Many people using SSL/TLS skip the authentication (often unknowingly).
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==Related [[Controls]]==
  
==Related problems ==
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* Design: Ensure that proper authentication is included in the system design.
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* Implementation: Understand and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the identity of entities involved in encrypted communications.
  
* Failure to follow chain of trust in certificate validation
 
  
* Failure to validate host-specific certificate data
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==Related [[Technical Impacts]]==
  
* Failure to validate certificate expiration
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* [[Technical Impact 1]]
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* [[Technical Impact 2]]
  
* Failure to check for certificate revocation
 
  
==Categories ==
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==References==
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TBD
  
[[Category:Vulnerability]]
 
  
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__NOTOC__
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[[Category:OWASP ASDR Project]]
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[[Category:Vulnerability]]
 
[[Category:Protocol Errors]]
 
[[Category:Protocol Errors]]
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[[Category:OWASP_CLASP_Project]]
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[[Category:Cryptographic Vulnerability]]
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[[Category:Vulnerability]]

Latest revision as of 08:31, 26 February 2009

This is a Vulnerability. To view all vulnerabilities, please see the Vulnerability Category page.


Last revision (mm/dd/yy): 02/26/2009

Vulnerabilities Table of Contents

Description

Performing a key exchange without verifying the identity of the entity being communicated with will preserve the integrity of the information sent between the two entities; this will not, however, guarantee the identity of end entity.

Consequences

  • Authentication: No authentication takes place in this process, bypassing an assumed protection of encryption
  • Confidentiality: The encrypted communication between a user and a trusted host may be subject to a "man-in-the-middle" sniffing attack

Exposure period

  • Design: Proper authentication should be included in the system design.
  • Design: Use a language which provides an interface to safely handle this exchange.
  • Implementation: If use of SSL (or similar) is simply mandated by design and requirements, it is the implementor's job to properly use the API and all its protections.

Platform

  • Languages: Any language which does not provide a framework for key exchange.
  • Operating platforms: All

Required resources

Any

Severity

High

Likelihood of exploit

High

Key exchange without entity authentication may lead to a set of attacks known as "man-in-the-middle" attacks. These attacks take place through the impersonation of a trusted server by a malicious server. If the user skips or ignores the failure of authentication, the server may request authentication information from the user and then use this information with the true server to either sniff the legitimate traffic between the user and host or simply to log in manually with the user's credentials.


Risk Factors

TBD

Examples

Many systems have used Diffie-Hellman key exchange without authenticating the entities exchanging keys, leading to man-in-the-middle attacks. Many people using SSL/TLS skip the authentication (often unknowingly).

Related Attacks

Related Vulnerabilities

Related Controls

  • Design: Ensure that proper authentication is included in the system design.
  • Implementation: Understand and properly implement all checks necessary to ensure the identity of entities involved in encrypted communications.


Related Technical Impacts


References

TBD