Revision as of 23:36, 20 August 2011 by Kevin W. Wall
Building an Assurance Case for ESAPI
- summary: make Claims, provide supporting Evidence, and make Arguments for how the evidence supports the claims
- Highest level claim is "The system is Acceptably Secure" but how to break this down into sub-claims that map to the provided evidence? e.g. absence of specific vulns (as investigated by manual testing or tool scans)
- Hey! How about an explicit threat model??? Especially, what are our assumptions.
- claims could be summarized using a Software Facts Label
- each language (Java, ASP, etc.) may need separate claims
- list the third-party software
- discuss coding practices that were followed, skill levels of developers, amount of independent review
- publish scanning tool results. "Tool X, using rule set R on date D, was run against ESAPI version Y using configuration Z, and found this set of results with this amount of code coverage."
- was OWASP Top Ten followed?
- how was performance and security balanced?
- what is the level of training of the developers? amount of experience in web development?
- were tools part of the whole process or run at the end?
- how was code repository prevented from unauthorized alterations?
- practices for code check-in and independent review - how is introduction of Trojans avoided?
- what threat level is being accounted for (e.g. will this only work against script kiddies)? was threat modeling used?