Difference between revisions of "Category:OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project"

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{{OWASP Defenders}}
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{{Social Media Links}}
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<div style="width:100%;height:90px;border:0,margin:0;overflow: hidden;">[[File: flagship_big.jpg|link=https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Project_Stages#tab=Flagship_Projects]]</div>
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= Home =
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==OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS)==
  
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'''The 1st Line of Defense Against Web Application Attacks'''
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'''Essential Plug-n-Play Protection from Web Application Attacks'''
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The OWASP ModSecurity CRS Project's goal is to provide an easily "pluggable" set of generic attack detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web application.
 +
The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack detection rules for use with [https://www.modsecurity.org ModSecurity] or compatible web application firewalls.
 +
The CRS aims to protect web applications from a wide range of attacks, including the [[Top10|OWASP Top Ten]], with a minimum of false alerts.
  
ModSecurity™ is a web application firewall engine that provides very little protection on its own. In order to become useful, ModSecurity™ must be configured with rules. In order to enable users to take full advantage of ModSecurity™ out of the box, the [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Defenders OWASP Defender Community] has developed and maintains a free set of application protection rules called the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS). Unlike intrusion detection and prevention systems, which rely on signatures specific to known vulnerabilities, the CRS provides '''''generic protection''''' from unknown vulnerabilities often found in web applications.
+
More information at [https://modsecurity.org/crs https://modsecurity.org/crs].
<paypal>ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project</paypal>
 
  
'''Core Rules Content'''
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==Description==
  
In order to provide generic web applications protection, the Core Rules use the following techniques:
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{| style="width: 100%;"
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| style="vertical-align:top;" | The OWASP ModSecurity CRS provides protections in the following attack/threat categories:
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* SQL Injection (SQLi)
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* Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
 +
* Local File Inclusion (LFI)
 +
* Remote File Inclusion (RFI)
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* Remote Code Execution (RCE)
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* PHP Code Injection
 +
* HTTP Protocol Violations
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* Shellshock
 +
* Session Fixation
 +
* Scanner Detection
 +
* Metadata/Error Leakages
 +
* Project Honey Pot Blacklist
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* GeoIP Country Blocking
 +
 
 +
More Information at [https://modsecurity.org/crs https://modsecurity.org/crs].
 +
 
 +
| style="text-align:right;" | [[File:CRS3-movie-poster-thumb.jpeg|300px|link=https://coreruleset.org/poster]]
 +
|}
  
*'''HTTP Protection''' - detecting violations of the HTTP protocol and a locally defined usage policy.
+
==Getting Started / Tutorials==
*'''Real-time Blacklist Lookups''' - utilizes 3rd Party IP Reputation
 
*'''Web-based Malware Detection''' - identifies malicious web content by check against the Google Safe Browsing API.
 
*'''HTTP Denial of Service Protections''' - defense against HTTP Flooding and Slow HTTP DoS Attacks.
 
*'''Common Web Attacks Protection''' - detecting common web application security attack.
 
*'''Automation Detection''' - Detecting bots, crawlers, scanners and other surface malicious activity.
 
*'''Integration with AV Scanning for File Uploads''' - detects malicious files uploaded through the web application.
 
*'''Tracking Sensitive Data''' - Tracks Credit Card usage and blocks leakages.
 
*'''Trojan Protection''' - Detecting access to Trojans horses.
 
*'''Identification of Application Defects''' - alerts on application misconfigurations.
 
*'''Error Detection and Hiding''' - Disguising error messages sent by the server.
 
  
|
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The following tutorials will get you started with ModSecurity and the CRS v3.
[[Image:ModSecurity_Logo_2011.JPG|200px|right|link=http://www.modsecurity.org/]]
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* [https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorial-6_embedding-modsecurity/ Installing ModSecurity]
 +
* [https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorial-7_including-modsecurity-core-rules/ Including the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set]
 +
* [https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorial-8_handling-false-positives-modsecurity-core-rule-set/ Handling False Positives with the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set]
  
|}
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These tutorials are part of a big series of Apache / ModSecurity guides published by [https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorials netnea]. They are written by [[:user:Dune73|Christian Folini]].
  
{| width="100%"
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More Information about the rule set at [https://modsecurity.org/crs https://modsecurity.org/crs] and a full list of all the rules in the Core Rule Set at [https://netnea.com/crs https://netnea.com/crs].
|-
 
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== Let's talk here  ==
 
  
[[Image:Asvs-bulb.jpg]]'''ModSecurity Communities'''
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==Licensing==
 +
OWASP ModSecurity CRS is free to use. It is licensed under the [http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txt Apache Software License version 2 (ASLv2)], so you can copy, distribute and transmit the work, and you can adapt it, and use it commercially, but all provided that you attribute the work and if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under the same or similar license to this one.
  
Further development of ModSecurity and the Core Rule Set occurs through mailing list discussions and occasional workshops, and suggestions for improvement are welcome. For more information, please [mailto:ryan.barnett@owasp.org contact us].
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| valign="top"  style="padding-left:25px;width:200px;" |
  
*[https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-modsecurity-core-rule-set CRS mailing list (this is the main list)]
 
*[http://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/mod-security-users ModSecurity mailing list]
 
  
|
 
== Want to help?  ==
 
  
[[Image:Asvs-waiting.JPG]]'''CRS Development'''
+
== Project Members ==
  
The CRS project is always on the lookout for volunteers who are interested in contributing.  We need help in the following areas:  
+
Project Leaders:
 +
* [[:User:Chaim_sanders|Chaim Sanders]]
 +
* [[:user:Dune73|Christian Folini]]
 +
* [[:User:lifeforms|Walter Hop]]
 +
Contributors:
 +
* Christoph Hansen
 +
* Felipe 'Zimmerle' Costa
 +
* Franziska Bühler
 +
* Victor Hora
  
*Documentation of the CRS
+
== Presentation ==
*New Detection Methods
 
*Updates to existing rules
 
  
|
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*[https://www.owasp.org/images/a/a9/AppSecDC_2010-ModSecurityCRS_Ryan_Barnett.ppt OWASP ModSecurity CRS Preso - PPT]
== Related resources  ==
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*[http://vimeo.com/20166971 OWASP ModSecurity CRS Preso - Video]
  
[[Image:Asvs-satellite.jpg]]'''OWASP Resources'''
+
== Related Projects ==
  
 
*[[http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Securing_WebGoat_using_ModSecurity_Project OWASP Securing WebGoat using ModSecurity Project]]  
 
*[[http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Securing_WebGoat_using_ModSecurity_Project OWASP Securing WebGoat using ModSecurity Project]]  
Line 73: Line 78:
 
*[[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Blacklist_Regex_Repository OWASP Blacklist Regex Repository]]
 
*[[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Blacklist_Regex_Repository OWASP Blacklist Regex Repository]]
  
|}
+
== Quick Download ==
  
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/archive/v3.0.0.tar.gz Latest CRS (TAR/GZ)]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/archive/v3.0.0.zip Latest CRS (ZIP)]
  
= Download =
+
| valign="top"  style="padding-left:25px;width:200px;" |
  
GitHub Repository is here:
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== Source Code Repo ==
  
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
+
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs OWASP ModSecurity CRS on GitHub]
  
Download TAR/GZ Archive:
+
== News and Events ==
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/tarball/master
+
* [10 Nov 2016] - [https://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/owasp-modsecurity-core-rule-set/2016-November/002265.html CRS3 Released]
  
Download ZIP Archive:
+
== Mailing List ==
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/zipball/master
 
  
= Bug Tracker =
+
*[https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-modsecurity-core-rule-set OWASP CRS Mail-list]
  
GitHub Issues:
+
==Classifications==
  
https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues
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  {| width="200" cellpadding="2"
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  |-
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  | align="center" valign="top" width="50%" rowspan="2"| [[File:Owasp-flagship-trans-85.png|link=https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Project_Stages#tab=Flagship_Projects]]
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  | align="center" valign="top" width="50%"| [[File:Owasp-defenders-small.png|link=]]
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  |-
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  | colspan="2" align="center"  width="50%" | [http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.html License: ASLv2]
 +
  |-
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  | colspan="2" align="center"  | [[File:Project_Type_Files_CODE.jpg|link=]]
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  |}
  
= Demo =
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==Donate==
 +
<paypal>ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project</paypal>
  
ModSecurity CRS Demonstration/Smoketest page:
+
|}
  
http://www.modsecurity.org/demo/
+
=Getting Started=
  
= Contributors and Users =
+
The following tutorials will get you started with ModSecurity and the CRS v3.
 +
* [https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorial-6_embedding-modsecurity/ Installing ModSecurity]
 +
* [https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorial-7_including-modsecurity-core-rules/ Including the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set]
 +
* [https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorial-8_handling-false-positives-modsecurity-core-rule-set/ Handling False Positives with the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set]
  
== Project Leader ==
+
These tutorials are part of a big series of Apache / ModSecurity guides published by [https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorials netnea]. They are written by [[:user:Dune73|Christian Folini]].
  
[[:User:Rcbarnett|Ryan Barnett]]
+
More Information at [https://modsecurity.org/crs https://modsecurity.org/crs].
  
== Project Contributors ==
+
=FAQs=
  
[[:User:Josh Amishav-Zlatin|Josh Zlatin]]<br>
+
== ModSecurity Rules Language ==
[[:User:Brian_Rectanus|Brian Rectanus]]<br>
 
[[:user:Roberto_Salgado|Roberto Salgado]]
 
  
== Project Users ==
+
=== What are the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rules (CRS) and why should I use them? ===
  
WASC Distributed Web Honeypot Project uses the Core Rule Set -
+
Using ModSecurity requires rules. In order to enable users to take full advantage of ModSecurity immediately, Trustwave's SpiderLabs is sponsoring the OWASP ModSecrity Core Rule Set (CRS) Project. Unlike intrusion detection and prevention systems which rely on signature specific to known vulnerabilities, the Core Rule Set provides generic protection from unknown vulnerabilities often found in web application that are in most cases custom coded. You may also consider writing custom rules for providing a positive security envelope to your application or critical parts of it. The Core Rule Set is heavily commented to allow it to be used as a step-by-step deployment guide for ModSecurity.
http://projects.webappsec.org/Distributed-Web-Honeypots
 
  
Akamai's WAF Service is based on a previous version of the Core Rule Set -
+
=== What attacks do the Core Rules protect against? ===
http://www.akamai.com/html/about/press/releases/2009/press_121409.html
 
  
Varnish Web Cache/Accelerator uses a converted version of the CRS -
+
In order to provide generic web applications protection, the Core Rules use the following techniques:
https://github.com/comotion/security.vcl
 
 
 
= Project Sponsors =
 
 
 
[[Image:SpiderLabs Logo 2011.JPG|200px|left|link=https://www.trustwave.com/spiderLabs.php]]
 
<br>
 
 
 
= Installation =
 
  
'''Quick Start'''
+
*HTTP protection - detecting violations of the HTTP protocol and a locally defined usage policy.
 +
*Common Web Attacks Protection - detecting common web application security attack.
 +
*Automation detection - Detecting bots, crawlers, scanners and other surface malicious activity.
 +
*Trojan Protection - Detecting access to Trojans horses.
 +
*Errors Hiding – Disguising error messages sent by the server
  
== Core Rule Set Quick Setup ==
+
In addition the ruleset also hints at the power of ModSecurity beyond providing security by reporting access from the major search engines to your site.
  
To activate the rules for your web server installation:
+
=== How do I whitelist an IP address so it can pass through ModSecurity? ===
  
  1) The modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf includes management rules and directives
+
The first issue to realize is that in ModSecurity 2.0, the allow action is only applied to the current phase. This means that if a rule matches in a subsequent phase it may still take a disruptive action. The recommended rule configuration to allow a remote IP address to bypass ModSecurity rules is to do the following (where 192.168.1.100 should be substituted with the desired IP address):
    that can control important CRS functions. Pay attention to
+
background-color: #ffffcc;
    the SecRuleEngine setting (On by default) and that the SecDefaultAction
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SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.110" id:1,phase:1,nolog,pass,ctl:ruleEngine=Off
    directive is set to "pass". The 49 inbound blocking and 59 outbound blocking
 
    rules files use the "block" action which
 
    inherits this setting. The effectively means that you can toggle the
 
    SecDefaultAction setting to decide if you would like to deny on an
 
    anomaly scoring/correlation match.
 
  
    Update the PARANOID_MODE variable setting if you want to become more
+
If you want to allow uninterrupted access to the remote IP address, however you still want to log rule alerts, then you can use this rule -
    aggressive in your detection.  Caution - this will cause more false positives.
 
  
    Should also update the appropriate anomaly scoring levels that will be propagated
+
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.110" phase:1,nolog,allow,ctl:ruleEngine=DetectionOnly
    to the inbound/outbound blocking files.
 
  
    Update the TX policy settings for allowed Request Methods, File Extensions, etc...
+
If you want to disable both the rule and audit engines, then you can optionally add another ctl action:
  
  2) Add the following line to your httpd.conf (assuming
+
SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.110" phase:1,nolog,allow,ctl:ruleEngine=Off,ctl:auditEngine=Off
    you've placed the rule files into conf/modsecurity_crs/):
 
  
        <IfModule security2_module>
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=== How do I handle False Positives and creating Custom Rules? ===
                Include conf/modsecurity_crs/*.conf
 
                Include conf/modsecurity_crs/base_rules/*.conf
 
        </IfModule>
 
  
  3) Restart web server.
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It is inevitable; you will run into some False Positive hits when using web application firewalls. This is not something that is unique to ModSecurity. All web application firewalls will generate false positives from time to time. The following Blog post information will help to guide you through the process of identifying, fixing, implementing and testing new custom rules to address false positives.
 
 
  4) Make sure your web sites are still running fine.
 
 
 
  5) Simulate an attack against the web server. Then check
 
    the attack was correctly logged in the Apache error log,
 
    ModSecurity debug log (if you enabled it) and ModSecurity
 
    audit log (if you enabled it).
 
 
 
 
 
= Documentation =
 
 
 
== ModSecurity Blog Posts ==
 
 
 
http://blog.spiderlabs.com/modsecurity/
 
 
 
*ModSecurity Advanced Topic of the Week: Traditional vs. Anomaly Scoring Detection Modes
 
http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/advanced-topic-of-the-week-traditional-vs-anomaly-scoring-detection-modes.html
 
 
 
*ModSecurity Advanced Topic of the Week: Exception Handling
 
 
http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/08/modsecurity-advanced-topic-of-the-week-exception-handling.html
 
http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/08/modsecurity-advanced-topic-of-the-week-exception-handling.html
  
== Rule Documentation Template ==
+
=== Will using a large amount of negative filtering rules impact performance? ===
  
Each ModSecurity Rule in the CRS has an individual rule description page based on the following template file:
+
Yes. Each and every rule that you implement will consume resources (RAM, CPU, etc...). The two most important factors to consider with creating ModSecurity rules are the total number of rules and the Regular Expression optimizations. A single rule with a complex regular expression is significantly faster than multiple rules with simple regular expressions. Unfortunately, it is quite easy to create inefficient RegEx patterns. Optimizing RegExs by utilizing Grouping Only/Non-Capturing Parentheses can cut the validation time by up to 50%. The Core Ruleset is optimized for performance.
 +
background-color: #ffffcc;
 +
=== What is a Virtual Patch and why should I care? ===
  
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ModSecurity_CRS_Rule_Description_Template
+
Fixing identified vulnerabilities in web applications always requires time. Organizations often do not have access to a commercial application's source code and are at the vendor's mercy while waiting for a patch. Even if they have access to the code, implementing a patch in development takes time. This leaves a window of opportunity for the attacker to exploit. External patching (also called "just-in-time patching" and "virtual patching") is one of the biggest advantages of web application firewalls as they can fix this problem externally. A fix for a specific vulnerability is usually very easy to design and in most cases it can be done in less than 15 minutes.
  
*Project participants are encouraged to copy this template and create landing pages for each CRS rule
+
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Virtual_Patching_Cheat_Sheet
*Use this template and create a new page using the following format - http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=ModSecurity_CRS_RuleID-XXXXX (where XXXXX is the CRS ruleID)
 
  
Example:
+
== Managing Alerts ==
  
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/ModSecurity_CRS_RuleID-960911
+
=== How do I manage ModSecurity logs if I have multiple installations? ===
  
== ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) ==
+
If you have more then 1 ModSecurity installation, you have undoubtedly run into issues with consolidating, analyzing and responding to alert messages. Unfortunately, the original "Serial" format of the audit log was multi-line with all records held within one file. This made remote logging difficult. What was really needed was to have a mechanism to send logs onto a centralized logging host made specifically for processing ModSecurity Alert data. This is the purpose of the mlogc program. It comes with the ModSecurity source code and can be used to send individual audit log entries to a remote host in near real-time.
  
The ModSecurity Core Rule Set is provided to you under the terms and
+
=== Is there an open source Console to send my audit logs to? ===
conditions of GPL version 2
 
  
This directory contains the files for Core ModSecurity Rule Set
+
Christian Bockermann has developed an outstanding free tool called AuditConsole that allows you to centralize and analyze remote ModSecurity audit log data.
The rules are compatible with ModSecurity 2.5 (as of version 1.4.3)
 
  
== Overview ==
+
=== Can I send ModSecurity alert log data through Syslog? ===
  
Using ModSecurity requires rules. In order to enable users to take full
+
Yes. If you already have a central Syslog infrastructure setup and/or if you are using some sort of SIEM application, then you might want to include the short version ModSecurity alert messages that appear in the Apache error_log file. You can easily reconfigure Apache to send its error logs through Syslog onto a remote, central logging server. However, the data being forwarded is a very small subset of the entire transaction. It is only a warning message and not enough information to conduct proper incident response to determine if there was a false positive or if it was a legitimate attack. In order to determine this information, you need access to the ModSecurity Audit log files.
advantage of ModSecurity immediately, Trustwave is providing a free
 
Core rule set. Unlike intrusion detection and prevention systems which
 
rely on signature specific to known vulnerabilities, the Core Rule Set
 
provides generic protection from unknown vulnerabilities often found in web
 
application that are in most cases custom coded. This is what we call "Attack
 
Payload Detection."
 
  
Keep in mind that a predefined rule set is only part of the work required to
+
= Acknowledgements =
protect your web site. We strongly urge you to consult Ivan Ristic's book,
 
"ModSecurity Handbook" http://store.feistyduck.com/products/modsecurity-handbook
 
and the ModSecurity Reference Manual - http://www.modsecurity.org/documentation/.
 
The CRS is heavily commented to allow it to be used as a step-by-step
 
deployment guide for ModSecurity.
 
  
For more information refer to the OWASP Core Rule Set Project page at
+
== Project Leader ==
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project
 
  
Core Rules Mail-list -
+
[[:User:Chaim_sanders|Chaim Sanders]]
Suscribe here: https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/owasp-modsecurity-core-rule-set
 
Archive: https://lists.owasp.org/pipermail/owasp-modsecurity-core-rule-set/
 
  
== CRS 2.0 Design Concepts ==
+
== Project Contributors ==
  
=== CRS < 2.0 - Self-Contained Rules ===
+
*[[:User:Chaim_sanders|Chaim Sanders]]
 +
*[[:user:Dune73|Christian Folini]]
 +
*[[:User:lifeforms|Walter Hop]]
 +
*[[:User:Rcbarnett|Ryan Barnett]]
 +
*[[:User:Josh Amishav-Zlatin|Josh Zlatin]]
 +
*[[:User:Brian_Rectanus|Brian Rectanus]]
 +
*[[:user:Roberto_Salgado|Roberto Salgado]]
 +
*Nick Galbreath (libinjection)
  
Older (<2.0) CRS used individual, “self-contained” actions in rules
+
See changelog for more contributors.
- If a rule triggered, it would either deny or pass and log
 
- No intelligence was shared between rules
 
Not optimal from a rules management perspective (handling false positives/exceptions)
 
- Editing the regex could blow it up
 
- Typical method was to copy/paste rules into custom rules files and then edit rule logic
 
  and disable core rule ID.
 
- Heavily customized rules were less likely to be updated by the user
 
Not optimal from a security perspective
 
- Not every site had the same risk tolerance
 
- Lower severity alerts were largely ignored
 
- Individual low severity alerts are not important but several low severity events
 
  in the same transaction are.
 
  
== CRS 2.0 - Collaborative Detection ==
+
== Project Users ==
  
=== Rules - Detection and Management ===
+
OWASP/WASC Distributed Web Honeypot Project uses the Core Rule Set -
 +
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WASC_Distributed_Web_Honeypots_Project
  
Rules logic has changed by decoupling the inspection/detection from the blocking functionality
+
cPanel distributes the OWASP CRS with their ModSecurity package -
- Rules log.pass and set transactional variables (tx) to track anomaly scores and to
+
https://documentation.cpanel.net/display/CKB/OWASP+ModSecurity+CRS
  store meta-data about the rule match
 
- This TX rule match data can be used by other 3rd party rules (converter Emerging Threats
 
  Snort web attack rules) to more accurately correlate identified attacks with their
 
  attack vector locations.
 
- TX data of previous strong rule matches can also be used to conditionally apply weaker signatures
 
  that normally would have a high fasle positive rate.
 
- Rules also increase anomaly scores for both the attack category and global score which allows
 
  users to set a threshold that is appropriate for them.
 
- This also allows several low severity events to trigger alerts while individual ones are suppressed.
 
- Exceptions may be handled by either increasing the overall anomaly score threshold, or
 
  by adding rules to a local custom exceptions file where TX data of previous rule matches
 
  may be inspected and anomaly scores re-adjusted based on the false positive criteria.
 
  
User can now globally update which variables to inspect and the anomaly score settings in the
+
Akamai's WAF Service is based on a previous version of the Core Rule Set -
modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf file.
+
http://www.akamai.com/html/about/press/releases/2009/press_121409.html
- PARANOID_MODE setting which will apply rules to locations that have a higher false positive rate
 
- INBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE setting will be populated in the inbound blocking file and if a transaction
 
  score at the end of phase:2 is equal to or greater than this number, it will be denied.
 
- OUTBOUND_ANOMALY_SCORE setting will be populated in the outbound blocking file and it a transaction
 
  score at the end of phase:4 is equal to or greater than this number, it will be denied.
 
  
== Inbound/Outbound Blocking ==
+
CloudFlare's WAF uses the logic from the OWASP ModSecurity CRS -
 +
https://www.cloudflare.com/waf
 +
http://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflares-new-waf-compiling-to-lua/
  
The CRS rules themselves are configured with the pass action, which allows all the rules to be processed
+
Verizon/EdgeCast WAF uses ModSecurity and the OWASP ModSecurity CRS -
and for the proposed anomaly scoring/collaborative detection concept to work.  The inbound/outbound anomaly
+
http://www.edgecast.com/services/security/#waf
score levels may be set in the modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf file.  These scores will be evaluated in the
 
modsecurity_crs_49_inbound_blocking.conf and modsecurity_crs_59_outbound_blocking.conf files.  
 
  
== Alert Management - Correlated Event Creation ==
+
Varnish Web Cache/Accelerator uses a converted version of the CRS -
 
+
https://github.com/comotion/security.vcl
One of the top feedback items we have heard is that the CRS events in the Apache error_log file
 
were very chatty.  This was due to each rule triggering its own error_log entry.  What most people
 
wanted was for 1 correlated event to be generated that would give the user a higher level
 
determination as to what the event category was.
 
 
 
To that end- each CRS rule will generate an audit log event Message entry but they will not log
 
to the error_log on their own.  These rules are now considered basic or reference events and
 
may be reviewed in the audit log if the user wants to see what individual events contributed
 
to the overall anomaly score and event designation.
 
 
 
== Inbound/Outbound Correlation ==
 
 
 
After the transaction has completed (in the logging phase), the rules in the
 
base_rules/modsecurity_crs_60_correlation.conf file will conduct further post-processing by
 
analyzing any inbound events with any outbound events in order to provide a more
 
intelligent/priority correlated event.
 
 
 
- Was there an inbound attack?
 
- Was there an HTTP Status Code Error (4xx/5xx level)?
 
- Was there an application information leak?
 
 
 
If an inbound attack was detected
 
and either an outbound application status code error or infolead was detected, then the overall
 
event severity is raised -
 
 
 
- 0: Emergency - is generated from correlation where there is an inbound attack and
 
  an outbound leakage.
 
- 1: Alert - is generated from correlation where there is an inbound attack and an
 
  outbound application level error.
 
 
 
== Core Rule Set Content ==
 
 
 
In order to provide generic web applications protection, the Core Rule Set
 
uses the following techniques:
 
 
 
=== HTTP Protocol Validation and Protection ===
 
 
 
Detecting violations of the HTTP protocol and a locally
 
defined usage policy. This first line of protection ensures that all abnormal HTTP
 
requests are detected. This line of defense eliminates a large number of
 
automated and non targeted attacks as well as protects the web server itself.
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_20_protocol_violations.conf ====
 
 
 
Protocol vulnerabilities such as Response Splitting, Request Smuggling, Premature URL ending
 
- Content length only for non GET/HEAD methods
 
- Non ASCII characters or encoding in headers
 
- Valid use of headers (for example, content length is numerical)
 
- Proxy Access
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_21_protocol_anomalies.conf ====
 
 
 
Attack requests are different due to automation
 
- Missing headers such as Host, Accept, User-Agent
 
- Host is an IP address (common worm propagation method)
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_23_request_limits.conf ====
 
 
 
Policy is usually application specific
 
- Some restrictions can usually be applied generically
 
- White lists can be build for specific environments
 
  Limitations on Sizes
 
- Request size, Upload size
 
- # of parameters, length of parameter
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_30_http_policy.conf ====
 
 
 
Items that can be allowed or restricted
 
- Methods - Allow or restrict WebDAV, block abused methods such as CONNECT, TRACE or DEBUG
 
- File extensions – backup files, database files, ini files
 
- Content-Types (and to some extent other headers)
 
 
 
==== Automation Detection ====
 
 
 
Automated clients are both a security risk and a
 
commercial risk. Automated crawlers collect information from your site, consume
 
bandwidth and might also search for vulnerabilities on the web site. Automation
 
detection is especially useful for generic detection of comments spam.
 
 
 
Detecting bots, crawlers, scanners and other surface malicious activity.
 
Not aimed against targeted attacks, but against general malicious internet activity
 
- Offloads a lot of cyberspace junk & noise
 
- Effective against comment spam
 
- Reduce event count
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_35_bad_robots.conf ====
 
 
Detection of Malicious Robots
 
- Unique request attributes: User-Agent header, URL, Headers
 
- RBL Check of IP addresses
 
- Detection of security scanners
 
- Blocking can confuse security testing software (WAFW00f)
 
 
 
==== optional_rules/modsecurity_crs_42_comment_spam.conf ====
 
 
 
This rules file is only relevant if you are concerned about comment SPAM attacks.
 
The rules file will run an RBL check against the source IP address at SPAMHAUS and will
 
cache the response for 1 day.  If the client sends subsequent requests, it will be denied
 
without having to re-run an RBL check.
 
 
 
This file will also look for comment SPAM posting attacks which submit URL links.
 
 
 
=== Common Web Attacks Protection ===
 
 
 
Common Web Attacks Protection Rules on the second level address the common web
 
application security attack methods. These are the issues that can appear in
 
any web application. Some of the issues addressed are:
 
 
 
- SQL Injection
 
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
 
- OS Command execution
 
- Remote code inclusion
 
- LDAP Injection
 
- SSI Injection
 
- Information leak
 
- Buffer overflows
 
- File disclosure
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_40_generic_attacks.conf ====
 
 
- OS command injection and remote command access
 
- Remote file inclusion
 
- Session Fixation
 
 
 
==== optional_rules/modsecurity_crs_40_experimental.conf ====
 
 
 
The rules in this file are considered BETA quality as they have not been rigorously tested.
 
They attempt to address advanced attacks such as HTTP Parameter Pollution or use new rule
 
features or techniques.
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_42_tight_security.conf ====
 
 
 
This rules file attempts to identify all directory traversal variations.  It is prone to a high
 
level of false positives so set PARANOID_MODE if you want to run these rules.
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_41_sql_injection.conf ====
 
 
 
- SQL injection and blind SQL injection
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_41_xss.conf ====
 
 
 
- Cross site scripting (XSS)
 
 
 
=== Trojan Protection ===
 
 
 
ModSecurity Core Rule Set detects access to back doors
 
installed on a web server. This feature is very important in a hosting
 
environment when some of this backdoors may be uploaded in a legitimate way and
 
used maliciously. In addition the Core Rule Set includes a hook for adding
 
an Anti-Virus program such as ClamAV for checking file uploads.
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_45_trojans.conf ====
 
 
 
- Check uploading of http backdoor page
 
- Access detection
 
- Known signatures (x_key header)
 
- Generic file management output (gid, uid, drwx, c:\)
 
 
 
=== InfoLeakages ===
 
 
 
If all fails, the Core Rule Set will detect errors sent by
 
the web server. Detecting and blocking errors prevents attackers from
 
collecting reconnaissance information about the web application and also server
 
as a last line of defense in case an attack was not detected eariler.
 
 
 
==== base_rules/modsecurity_crs_50_outbound.conf ====
 
 
 
- HTTP Error Response Status Codes
 
- SQL Information Leakage
 
- Stack Dumps
 
- Source Code Leakage
 
 
 
=== Request Header Tagging ===
 
 
 
This concept is similar to anti-SPAM SMTP apps that will add additional mime headers
 
to emails providing the SPAM detection analysis information.  The CRS is attempting
 
to mimic this concept at the HTTP layer by adding additional request headers that
 
provide insight into any ModSecurity events that may have triggered during processing.
 
The advantage of this approach is that it allows a WAF to be in a detection-only mode
 
while still providing attack data to the destination application server.  The recieving
 
app server may then inspect the WAF request headers and make a determination whether
 
or not to process the transaction.  This concept is valuable in distributed web environments
 
and hosting architectures where a determination to block may only be appropriate at the
 
destination app server.
 
 
 
==== optional_rules/modsecurity_crs_49_header_tagging.conf ====
 
 
 
This rules file will take all of the TX attack variable data and populate Apache ENV
 
variables that Apache can then use to add X-WAF-Event request header data to the
 
request.
 
 
 
Example showing the consolidated X-WAF-Events and X-WAF-Score data -
 
 
 
GET /path/to/foo.php?test=1%27%20or%20%272%27=%272%27;-- HTTP/1.1
 
Host: www.example.com  
 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.1.5) Gecko/20091109 Ubuntu/9.10 (karmic) Firefox/3.5.5
 
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
 
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
 
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
 
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
 
X-WAF-Events: TX: / 999935-Detects common comment types-WEB_ATTACK/INJECTION-ARGS:test, TX:999923-Detects JavaScript location/document property access and window access obfuscation-WEB_ATTACK/INJECTION-REQUEST_URI_RAW, TX:950001- WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION-ARGS:test
 
X-WAF-Score: Total=48; sqli=2; xss=
 
Connection: Keep-Alive
 
  
= Presentations and Whitepapers =
+
== Project Sponsors ==
  
Current CRS v2 [[https://www.owasp.org/images/a/a9/AppSecDC_2010-ModSecurityCRS_Ryan_Barnett.ppt]] presented at AppSec DC 2010.
+
[[Image:SpiderLabs Logo 2011.JPG|200px|link=https://www.trustwave.com/spiderLabs.php]]
  
Ryan Barnett Presenting on the OWASP CRS v2 at AppSec DC 2010 - http://player.vimeo.com/play_redirect?quality=sd&codecs=h264&clip_id=20166971&time=1348856471&sig=6c81604ac26dec6f6e1ae034af18c817&type=html5_desktop_local
+
= Getting Involved =
  
= Related Projects =
+
The CRS project is a small community within the bigger OWASP community. We have a successful project with a wide user base and with the CRS3 release cycle, we have put the development on new feet.
  
[http://www.modsecurity.org/ ModSecurity-Open Source Web Application Firewall]<br>[[:Category:OWASP Securing WebGoat using ModSecurity Project|OWASP Securing WebGoat using ModSecurity]]<br>[[:Category:OWASP_AppSensor_Project|OWASP AppSensor Project]]
+
We have big plans and there is a need for all sort of contributions from people on a beginner and from people on an expert level alike.
  
= Release History =
 
  
== OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) CHANGES ==
+
'''Code''' : https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs <br />
 +
'''Issues''' : https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues <br />
 +
'''Feature Requests''' : https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues (interleaved the issues, look for the right tag, currently ''candidate issue'')<br />
  
== Report Bugs/Issues to GitHub Issues Tracker ==
 
* https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues
 
  
== Version 2.2.8 - 06/30/2013 ==
+
== Summary of GitHub Shortcuts / Bookmarks ==
  
Security Fixes:
+
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/labels/v3.0-dev%20Development Open Issues 3.0.x]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/labels/False%20Positive False Positives]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22False+Negative+-+Evasion%22 False Negatives]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+label%3A%22v3.1.0-rc1+Candidate+Issue%22 Feature Requests for 3.1]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen+-label%3A%22v3.1.0-rc1+Candidate+Issue%22 All Issues but not Feature Requests for 3.1]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/labels/Published%20Research Published research affecting project]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=type%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20no%3Alabel Open Issues without a label / tag]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=type%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20label%20no%3Aassignee Open Issues with a label, but without assignee]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=type%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20created%3A%3C2015-01-01 Open Issues before 2015]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=type%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20created%3A%3C2016-01-01 Open Issues before 2016]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=type%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20created%3A%3C2016-11-10 Open Issues before CRS3 was released (2016-11-10)]
 +
* [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=type%3Aissue%20is%3Aopen%20created%3A%3C2017-01-01 Open Issues before 2017]
  
Improvements:
+
== Plans for AppSecEU 2017 ==
* Updatd the /util directory structure
 
* Added scripts to check Rule ID duplicates
 
* Added script to remove v2.7 actions so older ModSecurity rules will work
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/pull/43
 
* Added new PHP rule (958977) to detect PHP exploits (Plesk 0-day from king cope)
 
  - http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Jun/21
 
  - http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2013/06/honeypot-alert-active-exploits-attempts-for-plesk-vulnerability-.html
 
  
  
Bug Fixes:
+
See separate page: [[CRSAppSecEU2017|Plans for AppSecEU 2017]]
* fix 950901 - word boundary added
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/pull/48
 
* fix regex error
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/pull/44
 
* Updated the Regex in 981244 to include word boundaries
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/36
 
* Problem with Regression Test (Invalid use of backslash) - Rule 960911 - Test2
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/34
 
* ModSecurity: No action id present within the rule - ignore_static.conf
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/17
 
* "Bad robots" rule blocks all Java applets on Windows XP machines
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/16
 
* duplicated rules id 981173
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/18
 
  
 +
== Archive: v3.0 Detection Concepts / Goals ==
  
== Version 2.2.7 - 12/19/2012 ==
 
 
Security Fixes:
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Added JS Overrides file to identify successfull XSS probes
 
* Added new XSS Detection Rules from Ashar Javed (http://twitter.com/soaj1664ashar)
 
  - http://jsfiddle.net/U9RmU/4/
 
* Updated the SQLi Filters to add in Oracle specific functions
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/pull/7
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed Session Hijacking rules
 
  - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/pull/8
 
* Fixed bug in XSS rules checking TX:PM_XSS_SCORE variable
 
 
== Version 2.2.6 - 09/14/2012 ==
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Started rule formatting update for better readability
 
* Added maturity and accuracy action data to each rule
 
* Updated rule revision (rev) action
 
* Added rule version (ver) action
 
* Added more regression tests (util/regression_tests/)
 
* Modified Rule ID 960342 to block large file attachments in phase:1
 
* Removed all PARANOID rule checks
 
* Added new Session Fixation rules
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed missing ending double-quotes in XSS rules file
 
* Moved SecDefaultAction setting from phase:2 to phase:1
 
* Fixed Session Hijacking SessionID Regex
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-79
 
* Changed the variable listing for many generic attack rules to exclude REQUEST_FILENAME
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-78
 
 
== Version 2.2.5 - 06/14/2012 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Renamed main config file to modsecurity_crs_10_setup.conf
 
* Updated the rule IDs to start from CRS reserved range: 900000
 
* Updated rule formatting for readibility
 
* Updated the CSRF rules to use UNIQUE_ID as the token source
 
* Added the zap2modsec.pl script to the /util directory which converts
 
  OWASP ZAP Scanner XML data into ModSecurity Virtual Patches
 
* Updated the Directory Traversal Signatures to include more obfuscated data
 
* Added Arachni Scanner Integration Lua script/rules files
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Added forceRequestBodyVariable action to rule ID 960904
 
* Updated the anomaly scoring value for rule ID 960000 to critical
 
  (Identified by Qualys Vulnerability & Malware Research Labs (VMRL))
 
* Updated Content-Type check to fix possible evasion with @within
 
  (Identified by Qualys Vulnerability & Malware Research Labs (VMRL))
 
 
 
== Version 2.2.4 - 03/14/2012 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Added Location and Set-Cookie checks to Response Splitting rule ID 950910
 
* Added a README file to the activated_rules directory
 
* Consolidate a number of SQL Injection rules into optimized regexs
 
* Removed multiMatch and replaceComments from SQL Injection rules
 
* Updated the SQLi regexs for greediness
 
* Updated the SQLi setvar anomaly score values to use macro expansion
 
* Removed PARANOID mode rules
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed missing comma before severity action in rules 958291, 958230 and 958231
 
* Fixed duplidate rule IDs
 
 
 
== Version 2.2.3 - 12/19/2011 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Added Watcher Cookie Checks to optional_rules/modsecurity_crs_55_appication_defects.conf file
 
  http://websecuritytool.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=Checks#cookies
 
* Added Watcher Charset Checks to optional_rules/modsecurity_crs_55_application_defects.conf file
 
  http://websecuritytool.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=Checks#charset
 
* Added Watcher Header Checks to optional_rules/modsecurity_crs_55_application_defects.conf file
 
  http://websecuritytool.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=Checks#header
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed Content-Type evasion issue by adding ctl:forceRequestBodyVariable action to
 
  rule ID 960010. (Identified by Andrew Wilson of Trustwave SpiderLabs).
 
* Updated the regex and added tags for RFI rules.
 
 
 
== Version 2.2.2 - 09/28/2011 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Updated the AppSensor Profiling (to use Lua scripts) for Request Exceptions Detection Points
 
* Added new Range header detection checks to prevent Apache DoS
 
* Added new Security Scanner User-Agent strings
 
* Added example script to the /util directory to convert Arachni DAST scanner
 
  XML data into ModSecurity virtual patching rules.
 
* Updated the SQLi Character Anomaly Detection Rules
 
* Added Host header info to the RESOURCE collection key for AppSensor profiling rules
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed action list for XSS rules (replaced pass,nolog,auditlog with block)
 
* Fixed Request Limit rules by removing & from variables
 
* Fixed Session Hijacking IP/UA hash captures
 
* Updated the SQLi regex for rule ID 981242
 
 
 
== Version 2.2.1 - 07/20/2011 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Extensive SQL Injection signature updates as a result of the SQLi Challenge
 
  http://www.modsecurity.org/demo/challenge.html
 
* Updated the SQL Error message detection in reponse bodies
 
* Updated SQL Injection signatures to include more DB functions
 
* Updated the WEAK SQL Injection signatures
 
* Added tag AppSensor/RE8 to rule ID 960018
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed Bad Robot logic for rule ID 990012 to further qualify User-Agent matches
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-70
 
* Fixed Session Hijacking rules to properly capture IP address network hashes.
 
* Added the multiMatch action to the SQLi rules
 
* Fixed a false negative logic flaw within the advanced_filter_converter.lua script
 
* Fixed missing : in id action in DoS ruleset.
 
* Updated rule ID 971150 signature to remove ;
 
 
 
== Version 2.2.0 - 05/26/2011 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Changed Licensing from GPLv2 to Apache Software License v2 (ASLv2)
 
  http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txt
 
* Created new INSTALL file outlining quick config setup
 
* Added a new rule regression testing framework to the /util directory
 
* Added new activated_rules directory which will allow users to place symlinks pointing
 
  to files they want to run.  This allows for easier Apache Include wild-carding
 
* Adding in new RULE_MATURITY and RULE_ACCURACY tags
 
* Adding in a check for X-Forwarded-For source IP when creating IP collection
 
* Added new Application Defect checks (55 app defect file) from Watcher tool (Check Charset)
 
  http://websecuritytool.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=Checks#charset
 
* Added new AppSensor rules to experimental_dir
 
  https://www.owasp.org/index.php/AppSensor_DetectionPoints
 
* Added new Generic Malicious JS checks in outbound content
 
* Added experimental IP Forensic rules to gather Client hostname/whois info
 
  http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2010/11/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-ip-forensics.html
 
* Added support for Mozilla's Content Security Policy (CSP) to the experimental_rules
 
  http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/04/modsecurity-advanced-topic-of-the-week-integrating-content-security-policy-csp.html 
 
* Global collection in the 10 file now uses the Host Request Header as the collection key.
 
  This allows for per-site global collections.
 
* Added new SpiderLabs Research (SLR) rules directory (slr_rules) for known vulnerabilties.
 
  This includes both converted web rules from Emerging Threats (ET) and from SLR Team.
 
* Added new SLR rule packs for known application vulns for WordPress, Joomla and phpBB
 
* Added experimental rules for detecting Open Proxy Abuse
 
  http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/03/detecting-malice-with-modsecurity-open-proxy-abuse.html
 
* Added experimental Passive Vulnerability Scanning ruleset using OSVDB and Lua API
 
  http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/02/modsecurity-advanced-topic-of-the-week-passive-vulnerability-scanning-part-1-osvdb-checks.html
 
* Added additional URI Request Validation rule to the 20 protocol violations file (Rule ID - 981227)
 
* Added new SQLi detection rules (959070, 959071 and 959072)
 
* Added "Toata dragostea mea pentru diavola" to the malicious User-Agent data
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-64
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Assigned IDs to all active SecRules/SecActions
 
* Removed rule inversion (!) from rule ID 960902
 
* Fixed false negative issue in Response Splitting Rule
 
* Fixed false negative issue with @validateByteRange check
 
* Updated the TARGETS lising for rule ID 950908
 
* Updated TX data for REQBODY processing
 
* Changed the pass action to block in the RFI rules in the 40 generic file
 
* Updated RFI regex to catch IP address usage in hostname
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-68
 
* Changed REQUEST_URI_RAW variable to REQUEST_LINE in SLR rules to allow matches on request methods.
 
* Updated the RFI rules in the 40 generic attacks conf file to remove explicit logging actions.
 
  They will now inherit the settings from the SecDefaultAction
 
 
 
== Version 2.1.2 - 02/17/2011 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Added experimental real-time application profiling ruleset.
 
* Added experimental Lua script for profiling the # of page scripts, iframes, etc..
 
  which will help to identify successful XSS attacks and planting of malware links.
 
* Added new CSRF detection rule which will trigger if a subsequent request comes too
 
  quickly (need to use the Ignore Static Content rules).
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Added missing " in the skipAfter SecAction in the CC Detection rule set
 
 
 
== Version 2.1.1 - 12/30/2010 ==
 
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Updated the 10 config conf file to add in pass action to User-Agent rule
 
* Updated the CSRF ruleset to conditionally do content injection - if the
 
  csrf token was created by the session hijacking conf file
 
* Updated the session hijacking conf file to only enforce rules if a SessionID
 
  Cookie was submitted
 
* Fixed macro expansion setvar bug in the restricted file extension rule
 
* Moved the comment spam data file into the optional_rules directory
 
 
 
== Version 2.1.0 - 12/29/2010 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Added Experimental Lua Converter script to normalize payloads. Based on
 
  PHPIDS Converter code and it used with the advanced filters conf file.
 
* Changed the name of PHPIDS converted rules to Advanced Filters
 
* Added Ignore Static Content (Performance enhancement) rule set
 
* Added XML Enabler (Web Services) rule set which will parse XML data
 
* Added Authorized Vulnerability Scanning (AVS) Whitelist rule set
 
* Added Denial of Service (DoS) Protection rule set
 
* Added Slow HTTP DoS (Connection Consumption) Protection rule set
 
* Added Brute Force Attack Protection rule set
 
* Added Session Hijacking Detection rule set
 
* Added Username Tracking rule set
 
* Added Authentication Tracking rule set
 
* Added Anti-Virus Scanning of File Attachments rule set
 
* Added AV Scanning program to /util directory
 
* Added Credit Card Usage Tracking/Leakage Prevention rule set
 
* Added experimental CC Track/PAN Leakage Prevention rule set
 
* Added an experimental_rules directory to hold new BETA rules
 
* Moved the local exceptions conf file back into base_rules dirctory however
 
  it has a ".example" extension to prevent overwriting customized versions
 
  when upgrading
 
* Separated out HTTP Parameter Pollution and Restricted Character Anomaly Detection rules to
 
  the experimental_rules directory
 
* Adding the REQUEST_HEADERS:User-Agent macro data to the initcol in 10 config file, which will
 
  help to make collections a bit more unique
 
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.10 - 11/29/2010 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Commented out the Anomaly Scoring Blocking Mode TX variable since, by default, the CRS
 
  is running in traditional mode.
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Moved all skipAfter actions in chained rules to chain starter SecRules
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/MODSEC-159
 
* Changed phases on several rules in the 20 protocol anomaly rules file to phase:1 to avoid FNs
 
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.9 - 11/17/2010 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Changed the name of the main config file to modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf.example so that
 
  it will not overwrite existing config settings.  Users should rename this file to activate
 
  it.
 
* Traditional detection mode is now the current default
 
* Users can now more easily toggle between traditional/standard mode vs. anomaly scoring mode
 
  by editing the modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf file
 
* Updated the disruptive actions in most rules to use "block" action instead of "pass".  This
 
  is to allow for the toggling between traditional vs. anomaly scoring modes.
 
* Removed logging actions from most rules so that it can be controlled from the SecDefaultAction
 
  setting in the modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf file
 
* Updated the anomaly scores in the modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf file to more closely match
 
  what is used in the PHPIDS rules.  These still have the same factor of severity even though
 
  the numbers themselves are smaller.
 
* Updated the 49 and 59 blocking rules to include the matched logdata
 
* Updated the TAG data to further classify attack/vuln categories.
 
* Updated the SQL Injection filters to detect more boolean logic attacks
 
* Moved some files to optional_rules directory (phpids, Emerging Threats rules)
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed Rule ID 960023 in optional_rules/modsecurity_crs_40_experimental.conf is missing 1 single quote
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-63
 
* Moved all skipAfter actions in chained rules to the rule starter line (must have ModSec v2.5.13 or higher)
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/MODSEC-159
 
* Fixed restricted file extension bug with macro expansion
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-60
 
* Updated the SQLI TX variable macro expansion data in the 49 and 60 files so that
 
  it matches what is being set in the sql injection conf file
 
* Fixed typo in SQL Injection regexs - missing backslash for word boundary (b)
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-62 
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.8 - 08/27/2010 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Updated the PHPIDS filters
 
* Updated the SQL Injection filters to detect boolean attacks (1<2, foo == bar, etc..)
 
* Updated the SQL Injection fitlers to account for different quotes
 
* Added UTF-8 encoding validation support to the modsecurity_crs_10_config.conf file
 
* Added Rule ID 950109 to detect multiple URL encodings
 
* Added two experimental rules to detect anomalous use of special characters
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed Encoding Detection RegEx (950107 and 950108)
 
* Fixed rules-updater.pl script to better handle whitespace
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/MODSEC-167
 
* Fixed missing pass action bug in modsecurity_crs_21_protocol_anomalies.conf
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-55
 
* Fixed the anomaly scoring in the modsecurity_crs_41_phpids_filters.conf file
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-54
 
* Updated XSS rule id 958001 to improve the .cookie regex to reduce false postives
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-29 
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.7 - 06/4/2010 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Added CSRF Protection Ruleset which will use Content Injection to add javascript to
 
  specific outbound data and then validate the csrf token on subsequent requests.
 
* Added new Application Defect Ruleset which will identify/fix missing HTTPOnly cookie
 
  flags
 
* Added Experimental XSS/Missing Output Escaping Ruleset which looks for user supplied
 
  data being echoed back to user unchanged.
 
* Added rules-updater.pl script and configuration file to allow users to automatically
 
  download CRS rules from the CRS rules repository.
 
* Added new SQLi keyword for ciel() and reverse() functions.
 
* Updated the PHPIDS filters
 
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Fixed false positives for Request Header Name matching in the 30 file by
 
  adding boundary characters. 
 
* Added missing pass actions to @pmFromFile prequalifier rules
 
* Added backslash to SQLi regex
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-41
 
* Fixed hard coded anomaly score in PHPIDS filter file
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-45
 
* Fixed restricted_extension false positive by adding boundary characters
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.6 - 02/26/2010 ==
 
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Added missing transformation functions to SQLi rules.
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-32
 
* Fixed duplicate rule IDs.
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-33
 
* Fixed typo in @pmFromFile in the Comment SPAM rules
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-34
 
* Added macro expansion to Restricted Headers rule
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-35
 
* Fixed misspelled SecMarker
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-36
 
* Fixed missing chain action in Content-Type header check
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-37
 
* Update phpids filters to use pass action instead of block
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.5 - 02/01/2010 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Removed previous 10 config files as they may conflict with local customized Mod configs.
 
* Added a new 10 config file that allows the user to globally set TX variables to turn on/off
 
  PARANOID_MODE inspection, set anomaly score levels and http policies.
 
  Must have ModSecurity 2.5.12 to use the macro expansion in numeric operators.
 
* Added Rule Logic and Reference links to rules descriptions.
 
* Added Rule IDs to all rules.
 
* Added tag data mapping to new OWASP Top 10 and AppSensor Projects, WASC Threat Classification
 
* Removed Apache limit directives from the 23 file
 
* Added macro expansion to 23 file checks.
 
* Added @pmFromFile check to 35 bad robots file
 
* Added malicious UA strings to 35 bad robots check
 
* Created an experimental rules file
 
* Updated HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) rule logic to concat data into a TX variable for inspection
 
* Removed TX inspections for generic attacks and reverted to standard ARGS inspection
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/MODSEC-120
 
* Updated the variable list for standard inspections (ARGS|ARGS_NAMES|XML:/*) and moved the other
 
  variables to the PARANOID list (REQUEST_URI|REQUEST_BODY|REQUEST_HEADERS|TX:HPP_DATA)
 
* Moved converted ET Snort rules to the /optional_rules directory
 
* Created a new Header Tagging ruleset (optional_rules) that will add matched rule data to the
 
  request headers.
 
* Updated Inbound blocking conf file to use macro expansion from the 10 config file settings
 
* Added separate anomaly scores for inbound, outbound and total to be evaluated for blocking.
 
* Updated the regex logic in the (1=1) rule to factor in quotes and other logical operators.
 
* Updated the SPAMMER RBL check rules logic to only check once per IP/Day.
 
* Added new outbound malware link detection rules.
 
* Added PHP "call_user_func" to blacklist
 
  Identified by SOGETI ESEC R&D
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Removed Non-numeric Rule IDs
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-28
 
* Updated the variable list on SQLi rules.
 
* Fixed outbound @pmFromFile action from allow to skipAfter to allow for outbound anomaly scoring
 
  and blocking
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.4 - 11/30/2009 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Updated converted PHPIDS signatures (https://svn.php-ids.org/svn/trunk/lib/IDS/default_filter.xml)
 
* Updated PHPIDS rules logic to first search for payloads in ARGS and then if there is no match found
 
  then search more generically in request_body|request_uri_raw
 
* Updated PHPIDS rules logic to only set TX variables and to not log.  This allows for more clean
 
  exceptions in the 48 file which can then expire/delete false positive TX matches and adjust the
 
  anomaly scores.  These rules will then inspect for any TX variables in phase:5 and create appropriate
 
  alerts for any variable matches that exist. 
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Added Anomaly Score check to the 60 correlation file to recheck the anomaly score at the end of
 
  phase:4 which would allow for blocking based on information leakage issues.
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.3 - 11/05/2009 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Updated converted PHPIDS signatures (https://svn.php-ids.org/svn/trunk/lib/IDS/default_filter.xml)
 
* Create a new PHPIDS Converter rules file (https://svn.php-ids.org/svn/trunk/lib/IDS/Converter.php)
 
* Added new rules to identify multipart/form-data bypass attempts
 
* Increased anomaly scoring (+100) for REQBODY_PROCESSOR_ERROR alerts
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Added t:urlDecodeUni transformation function to phpids rules to fix both false positives/negatives
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-17
 
* Added new variable locations to the phpids filters
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-19
 
* Use of transformation functions can cause false negatives - added multiMatch action to phpids rules
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-20
 
* Fixed multipart parsing evasion issues by adding strict parsing rules
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-21
 
* Fixed typo in xss rules (missing |)
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-22
 
* Fixed regex text in IE8 XSS filters (changed to lowercase)
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-23 
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.2 - 09/11/2009 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Added converted PHPIDS signatures (https://svn.php-ids.org/svn/trunk/lib/IDS/default_filter.xml)
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-13
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Rule 958297 - Fixed Comment SPAM UA false positive that triggered only on mozilla.
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-15
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.1 - 08/07/2009 ==
 
 
 
Improvements:
 
* Updated the transformation functions used in the XSS/SQLi rules to improve performance
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-10
 
 
* Updated the variable/target list in the XSS rules
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-11 
 
 
* Added XSS Filters from IE8
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-12
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Rule 958297 - Fixed unescaped double-quote issue in Comment SPAM UA rule.
 
  https://www.modsecurity.org/tracker/browse/CORERULES-9
 
 
 
== Version 2.0.0 - 07/29/2009 ==
 
 
 
New Rules & Features:
 
* Fine Grained Policy
 
    The rules have been split to having one signature per rule instead of having
 
    all signatures combined into one optimized regular expression.
 
    This should allow you to modify/disable events based on specific patterns
 
    instead of having to deal with the whole rule.
 
* Converted Snort Rules
 
    Emerging Threat web attack rules have been converted.
 
    http://www.emergingthreats.net/
 
* Anomaly Scoring Mode Option
 
    The rules have been updated to include anomaly scoring variables which allow
 
    you to evaluate the score at the end of phase:2 and phase:5 and decide on what
 
    logging and disruptive actions to take based on the score.
 
* Correlated Events
 
    There are rules in phase:5 that will provide some correlation between inbound
 
    events and outbound events and will provide a result of successful atttack or
 
    attempted attack.
 
* Updated Severity Ratings
 
    The severity ratings in the rules have been updated to the following:
 
    - 0: Emergency - is generated from correlation where there is an inbound attack and
 
        an outbound leakage.
 
    - 1: Alert - is generated from correlation where there is an inbound attack and an
 
        outbound application level error.
 
    - 2: Critical - is the highest severity level possible without correlation.  It is
 
        normally generated by the web attack rules (40 level files).
 
    - 3: Error - is generated mostly from outbound leakabe rules (50 level files).
 
    - 4: Warning - is generated by malicious client rules (35 level files).
 
    - 5: Notice - is generated by the Protocol policy and anomaly files.
 
    - 6: Info - is generated by the search engine clients (55 marketing file).
 
* Updated Comment SPAM Protections
 
    Updated rules to include RBL lookups and client fingerprinting concepts from
 
    Bad Behavior (www.bad-behavior.ioerror.us)
 
* Creation of Global Collection
 
    Automatically create a Global collection in the *10* config file.  Other rules
 
    can then access it.
 
* Use of Block Action
 
    Updated the rules to use the "block" action.  This allows the Admin to globally
 
    set the desired block action once with SecDefaultAction in the *10* config file
 
    rather than having to edit the disruptive actions in all of the rules or for
 
    the need to have multiple versions of the rules (blocking vs. non-blocking).
 
* "Possible HTTP Parameter Pollution Attack: Multiple Parameters with the same Name."
 
  http://tacticalwebappsec.blogspot.com/2009/05/http-parameter-pollution.html
 
* Added new generic RFI detection rules.
 
  http://tacticalwebappsec.blogspot.com/2009/06/generic-remote-file-inclusion-attack.html
 
* "Possibly malicious iframe tag in output" (Rules 981001,981002)
 
    Planting invisible iframes in a site can be used by attackers to point users
 
    from the victim site to their malicious site. This is actually as if the
 
    user was visiting the attacker's site himself, causing the user's browser to
 
    process the content in the attacker's site.
 
 
New Events:
 
* Rule 960019 - Expect Header Not Allowed.
 
* Rule 960020 - Pragma Header Requires Cache-Control Header
 
* Rule 958290 - Invalid Character in Request - Browsers should not send the (#) character
 
                as it is reserved for use as a fragment identifier within the html page.
 
* Rule 958291 - Range: field exists and begins with 0.
 
* Rule 958292 - Invalid Request Header Found.
 
* Rule 958293 - Lowercase Via Request Header Found.
 
* Rule 958294 - Common SPAM Proxies found in Via Request Header.
 
* Rule 958295 - Multiple/Conflicting Connection Header Data Found.
 
* Rule 958296 - Request Indicates a SPAM client accessed the Site.
 
* Rule 958297 - Common SPAM/Email Harvester crawler.
 
* Rule 958298 - Common SPAM/Email Harvester crawler
 
 
Bug Fixes:
 
* Rule 950107 - Split the rule into 2 separate rules to factor in the
 
                Content-Type when inspecting the REQUEST_BODY variable.
 
* Rule 960017 - Bug fix for when having port in the host header.
 
* Rule 960014 - Bug fix to correlate the SERVER_NAME variable.
 
* Rule 950801 - Increased the logic so that the rule will only run if the web site
 
                uses UTF-8 Encoding.
 
* Rules 999210,999211 - Bug fix to move ctl actions to last rule, add OPTIONS and
 
                        allow the IPv6 loopback address
 
* Rule 950117 - Updated the RFI logic to factor in both a trailing "?" in the ARG
 
                and to identify offsite hosts by comparing the ARG URI to the Host
 
                header.  Due to this rule now being stronger, moved it from optional
 
                tight security rule to *40* generic attacks file.
 
 
Other Fixes:
 
* Added more HTTP Protocol violations to *20* file.
 
* Set the SecDefaultAction in the *10* config file to log/pass (This was the
 
  default setting, however this sets it explicitly.
 
* Added SecResponseBodyLimitAction ProcessPartial to the *10* config file.  This
 
  was added so that when running the SecRuleEngine in DetectionOnly mode, it will
 
  not deny response bodies that go over the size restrictions.
 
* Changed SecServerSignature to "Apache/1.3.28"
 
* Fixed the use of SkipAfter and SecMarkers to make it consistent.  Now have
 
  BEGIN and END SecMarkers for rule groups to more accurately allow moving to
 
  proper locations.
 
* Fixed the @pm/@pmFromFile pre-qualifier logic to allow for operator inversion.
 
  This removes the need for some SecAction/SkipAfter rules.
 
* Updated rule formatting to easily show rule containers (SecMarkers, pre-qualifier
 
  rules and chained rules).
 
 
 
== Version 1.6.1 - 2008/04/22 ==
 
 
 
* Fixed a bug where phases and transformations where not specified explicitly
 
    in rules. The issue affected a significant number of rules, and we strongly
 
    recommend to upgrade.
 
 
 
== Version 1.6.0 - 2008/02/19 ==
 
 
 
New Rulesets & Features:
 
* 42 - Tight Security
 
    This ruleset contains currently 2 rules which are considered highly prone
 
    to FPs. They take care of Path Traversal attacks, and RFI attacks. This
 
    ruleset is included in the optional_rulesets dir
 
* 42 - Comment Spam
 
    Comment Spam is used by the spammers to increase their rating in search
 
    engines by posting links to their site in other sites that allow posting
 
    of comments and messages. The rules in this ruleset will work against that.
 
    (Requires ModSecurity 2.5)
 
* Tags
 
    A single type of attack is often detected by multiple rules. The new alert
 
    classification tags solve this issue by providing an alternative alert type
 
    indication and can serve for filtering and analysis of audit logs.
 
    The classification tags are hierarchical with slashes separating levels.
 
    Usually there are two levels with the top level describing the alert group
 
    and the lower level denoting the alert type itself, for example:
 
    WEB_ATTACK/SQL_INJECTION.
 
 
False Positives Fixes:
 
* Rule 960903 - Moved to phase 4 instead of 5 to avoid FPs
 
* Rule 950107 - Will look for invalid url decoding in variables that are not
 
                automatically url decoded
 
 
Additional rules logic:
 
* Using the new "logdata" action for logging the matched signature in rules
 
* When logging an event once, init the collection only if the alert needs to log
 
* Using the new operator @pm as a qualifier before large rules to enhance
 
    performance (Requires ModSecurity 2.5)
 
* SQL injection - A smarter regexp is used to detect 1=1,2=2,etc.. and not
 
    only 1=1. (Thanks to Marc Stern for the idea)
 
* New XSS signatures - iframe & flash XSS
 
 
 
 
== Version 1.5.1 - 2007/12/6 ==
 
 
 
False Positives Fixes:
 
* Protocol Anomalies (file 21) - exception for Apache SSL pinger (Request: GET /)
 
 
New Events:
 
* 960019 - Detect HTTP/0.9 Requests
 
  HTTP/0.9 request are not common these days. This rule will log by default,
 
  and block in the blocking version of file 21
 
 
 
Other Fixes:
 
* File 40, Rules 950004,950005 - Repaired the correction for the double
 
  url decoding problem
 
* File 55 contained empty regular expressions. Fixed.           
 
 
 
== Version 1.5 - 2007/11/23 ==
 
 
 
New Rulesets:
 
* 23 - Request Limits
 
    "Judging by appearances". This rulesets contains rules blocking based on
 
    the size of the request, for example, a request with too many arguments
 
    will be denied.
 
 
Default policy changes:
 
* XML protection off by default
 
* BLOCKING dir renamed to optional_rules
 
* Ruleset 55 (marketing) is now optional (added to the optional_rules dir)
 
* Ruleset 21 - The exception for apache internal monitor will not log anymore
 
 
New Events:
 
* 960912 - Invalid request body
 
  Malformed content will not be parsed by modsecurity, but still there might
 
  be applications that will parse it, ignoring the errors.
 
* 960913 - Invalid Request
 
  Will trigger a security event when request was rejected by apache with
 
  code 400, without going through ModSecurity rules.
 
 
Additional rules logic:
 
* 950001 - New signature: delete from
 
* 950007 - New signature: waitfor delay
 
 
False Positives Fixes:
 
* 950006 - Will not be looking for /cc pattern in User-Agent header
 
* 950002 - "Internet Explorer" signature removed
 
* Double decoding bug used to cause FPs. Some of the parameters are already
 
  url-decoded by apache. This caused FPs when the rule performed another
 
  url-decoding transformation. The rules have been split so that parameters
 
  already decoded by apache will not be decoded by the rules anymore.
 
* 960911 - Expression is much more permissive now
 
* 950801 - Commented out entirely. NOTE: If your system uses UTF8 encoding,
 
          then you should uncomment this rule (in file 20)
 
 
 
version 1.4.3 - 2007/07/21
 
 
 
New Events:
 
* 950012 - HTTP Request Smuggling
 
  For more info on this attack:
 
  http://www.cgisecurity.com/lib/HTTP-Request-Smuggling.pdf
 
* 960912 - Invalid request body
 
  Malformed content will not be parsed by modsecurity, but still there might
 
  be applications that will parse it, ignoring the errors.
 
* 960913 - Invalid Request
 
  Will trigger a security event when request was rejected by apache with
 
  code 400, without going through ModSecurity rules.
 
 
False Positives Fixes:
 
* 950107 - Will allow a % sign in the middle of a string as well
 
* 960911 - A more accurate expression based on the rfc:
 
            http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt
 
* 950015 - Will not look for http/ pattern in the request headers
 
 
Additional rules logic:
 
* Since Apache applies scope directives only after ModSecurity phase 1
 
  this directives cannot be used to exclude phase 1 rules. Therefore
 
  we moved all inspection rules to phase 2.
 
 
 
 
version 1.4 build 2 - 2007/05/17
 
 
 
New Feature:
 
* Search for signatures in XML content
 
    XML Content will be parsed and ispected for signatures
 
 
New Events:
 
* 950116 - Unicode Full/Half Width Abuse Attack Attempt
 
    Full-width unicode can by used to bypass content inspection. Such encoding will be forbidden
 
    http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/739224
 
* 960911 - Invalid HTTP request line
 
    Enforce request line to be valid, i.e.: <METHOD> <path> <HTTP version>
 
* 960904 - Request Missing Content-Type (when there is content)
 
    When a request contains content, the content-type must be specified. If not, the content will not be inspected
 
* 970018 - IIS installed in default location (any drive)
 
    Log once if IIS in installed in the /Inetpub directory (on any drive, not only C)
 
* 950019 - Email Injection
 
    Web forms used for sending mail (such as "tell a friend") are often manipulated by spammers for sending anonymous emails
 
 
Regular expressions fixes:
 
* Further optimization of some regular expressions (using the non-greediness operator)
 
    The non-greediness operator, <?>, prevents excessive backtracking
 
 
FP fixes:
 
* Rule 950107 - Will allow a parameter to end in a % sign from now on
 
 
 
version 1.4 - 2007/05/02
 
 
 
New Events:
 
* 970021 - WebLogic information disclosure
 
    Matching of "<title>JSP compile error</title>" in the response body, will trigger this rule, with severity 4 (Warning)
 
* 950015,950910,950911 - HTTP Response Splitting
 
    Looking for HTTP Response Splitting patterns as described in Amit Klein's excellent white paper:
 
    http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/papers/general/whitepaper_httpresponse.pdf
 
ModSecurity does not support compressed content at the moment. Thus, the following rules have been added:
 
* 960902 - Content-Encoding in request not supported
 
    Any incoming compressed request will be denied
 
* 960903 - Content-Encoding in response not suppoted
 
    An outgoing compressed response will be logged to alert, but ONLY ONCE.
 
 
False Positives Fixes:
 
* Removed <.exe>,<.shtml> from restricted extensions
 
* Will not be looking for SQL Injection signatures <root@>,<coalesce> in the Via request header
 
* Excluded Referer header from SQL injection, XSS and command injection rules
 
* Excluded X-OS-Prefs header from command injection rule
 
* Will be looking for command injection signatures in
 
  REQUEST_COOKIES|REQUEST_COOKIES_NAMES instead of REQUEST_HEADERS:Cookie.
 
* Allowing charset specification in the <application/x-www-form-urlencoded> Content-Type
 
 
Additional rules logic:
 
* Corrected match of OPTIONS method in event 960015
 
* Changed location for event 960014 (proxy access) to REQUEST_URI_RAW
 
* Moved all rules apart from method inspection from phase 1 to phase 2 -
 
    This will enable viewing content if such a rule triggers as well as setting
 
    exceptions using Apache scope tags.
 
* Added match for double quote in addition to single quote for <or x=x> signature (SQL Injection)
 
* Added 1=1 signature (SQL Injection)
 
 
 
version 1.3.2 build 4 2007/01/17
 
 
 
Fixed apache 2.4 dummy requests exclusion
 
Added persistent PDF UXSS detection rule
 
 
 
== Version 1.3.2 build 3 2007/01/10 ==
 
 
 
Fixed regular expression in rule 960010 (file #30) to allow multipart form data
 
content
 
 
 
== Version 1.3.2 - 2006/12/27 ==
 
 
 
New events:
 
* 960037  Directory is restricted by policy
 
* 960038  HTTP header is restricted by policy
 
 
Regular expressions fixes:
 
* Regular expressions with @ at end of beginning (for example "@import)
 
* Regular expressions with un-escaped "."
 
* Command Injections now always require certain characters both before and after the command. Important since many are common English words (finger, mail)
 
* The command injection wget is not searched in the UA header as it has different meaning there.
 
* LDAP Fixed to reduce FPs:
 
  + More accurate regular expressions
 
  + high bit characters not accpeted between signature tokens.
 
* Do not detect <?xml as a PHP tag in both PHP injection and PHP source leakage
 
* Removed Java from automation UA
 
* When validating encoding, added regexp based chained rule that accepts both %xx and %uxxxxx encoding bypassing a limitation of "@validateUrlEncoding"
 
 
Additional rules logic:
 
* Checks for empty headers in addition to missing ones  (Host, Accept and User-Agent)
 
* OPTIONS method does not require an accept header.
 
* Apache keep alive request exception.
 
* PROPFIND and OPTIONS can be used without content-encoding (like HEAD and GET)
 
* Validate byte range checks by default only that no NULL char exists.
 
* Added CSS to allowed extensions in strict rule sets.
 
* Changed default action in file #50 to pass instead of deny.
 
* Moved IP host header from protocol violations to protocol anomalies.
 
 
Modified descriptions:
 
* 950107: URL Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt
 
* 950801: UTF8 Encoding Abuse Attack Attempt
 
* Added matched pattern in many events using capture and %{TX.0}
 
* Added ctl:auditLogParts=+E for outbound events and attacks to collect response.
 
 
 
== Version 1.2 - 2006/11/19 ==
 
 
 
Changes:
 
+ Move all events to the range of events allocated to Thinking Stone, now Breach
 
by prefixing all event IDs with "9".
 
+ Reverse severities to follow the Syslog format used by ModSecurity, now 1 is
 
the highest and 5 the lowest.
 
 
Bug fixes:
 
+ Removed quotes from list of mime types inspected on exit (directive
 
SecResponseBodyMimeType)
 
+ Corrected "cd .." signature. Now the periods are escaped.
 
+ Too many FPs with events 950903 & 950905. Commented them out until fixed.
 
 
 
== Version 1.1 - 2006/10/18 ==
 
 
 
Initial version
 
 
= Roadmap =
 
 
=== Roadmap Items ===
 
 
This page outlines development projects which would add new functionality to ModSecurity that could be leveraged by the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set.
 
This page outlines development projects which would add new functionality to ModSecurity that could be leveraged by the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set.
  
== v3.0 Detection Concepts ==
 
This page documents the goals/ideas for the next major version of the CRS.
 
 
== Goals ==
 
 
These are not listed in any particular order.
 
These are not listed in any particular order.
 
# '''Add New Detection Logic'''
 
# '''Add New Detection Logic'''
Line 1,388: Line 284:
 
## Reorder/Regroup rule into new file names
 
## Reorder/Regroup rule into new file names
  
== Detection Logic/Flow Concepts ==
+
== Archive: Detection Logic/Flow Concepts in the Request Header Phase ==
 
This section outlines the processing flow and associated points of detection and actions taken.
 
This section outlines the processing flow and associated points of detection and actions taken.
 
# '''IP Reputation'''
 
# '''IP Reputation'''
Line 1,418: Line 314:
 
### Tag client as "suspicious" in IP collection
 
### Tag client as "suspicious" in IP collection
  
<!-- ==== Project Details ====
+
Involvement in the development and promotion of OWASP ModSecurity CRS is actively encouraged!
{{:Key Project Information:OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project}}  -->
+
You do not have to be a security expert in order to contribute.
 +
Some of the ways you can help:
 +
* Contribute on the mail-list by answering questions from the community
 +
* Report issues to our GitHub Issue tracker
 +
 
 +
=Upcoming Major Release 3.0.0=
 +
 
 +
The upcoming major Core Rules (CRS) release 3.0.0 is currently being developed in a separate branch on [https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/tree/v3.0.0-rc1 github]. The release is planned for the first quarter 2016. It brings incorporation of the <tt>@detectsqli</tt> and <tt>@detectxss</tt> operators and a general reduction of false positives for default setups.
 +
 
 +
==Infos about 3.0.0==
 +
* [https://www.netnea.com/cms/2015/12/20/modsec-crs-2-2-x-vs-3-0-0-dev/ Blogpost comparing CRS 2.2.x with 3.0.0-dev]
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===Development===
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* [[OWASP_ModSec_CRS_Paranoia_Mode | Paranoia Mode / Bringing back the rules that used to yield a high number of false positives]]
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=Project About=
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{{:Projects/OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project | Project About}}}   
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=CRS3 Poster=
  
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The CRS3 poster was designed by [[:User:Hugo_Costa|Hugo Costa]], OWASP's graphical designer. It can be reused under a CC BY-ND license.
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==== Project About ====
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The [https://www.owasp.org/images/e/eb/CRS3-movie-poster-nourl-5906x8268.jpeg large version] has a 300 dpi resolution, big enough to be printed in A2, A1, or even A0 format. The format is the standard poster size format 500mm x 700mm (19.68in x 27.56in).
  
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''The CRS is an open source rule set licensed under ASLv2. ModSecurity Core Rule Set works with ModSecurity 2.5 and above.''
 
  
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[[Category:OWASP Project|ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project]]
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[[Category:OWASP Project]] [[Category:OWASP_Defenders]] [[Category:OWASP_Document]] [[Category:SAMM-EH-3]]
[[Category:OWASP WAF|ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project]]
 
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Latest revision as of 01:27, 27 June 2017

Flagship big.jpg

OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS)

The 1st Line of Defense Against Web Application Attacks

The OWASP ModSecurity CRS Project's goal is to provide an easily "pluggable" set of generic attack detection rules that provide a base level of protection for any web application. The OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set (CRS) is a set of generic attack detection rules for use with ModSecurity or compatible web application firewalls. The CRS aims to protect web applications from a wide range of attacks, including the OWASP Top Ten, with a minimum of false alerts.

More information at https://modsecurity.org/crs.

Description

The OWASP ModSecurity CRS provides protections in the following attack/threat categories:
  • SQL Injection (SQLi)
  • Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
  • Local File Inclusion (LFI)
  • Remote File Inclusion (RFI)
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE)
  • PHP Code Injection
  • HTTP Protocol Violations
  • Shellshock
  • Session Fixation
  • Scanner Detection
  • Metadata/Error Leakages
  • Project Honey Pot Blacklist
  • GeoIP Country Blocking

More Information at https://modsecurity.org/crs.

CRS3-movie-poster-thumb.jpeg

Getting Started / Tutorials

The following tutorials will get you started with ModSecurity and the CRS v3.

These tutorials are part of a big series of Apache / ModSecurity guides published by netnea. They are written by Christian Folini.

More Information about the rule set at https://modsecurity.org/crs and a full list of all the rules in the Core Rule Set at https://netnea.com/crs.

Licensing

OWASP ModSecurity CRS is free to use. It is licensed under the Apache Software License version 2 (ASLv2), so you can copy, distribute and transmit the work, and you can adapt it, and use it commercially, but all provided that you attribute the work and if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under the same or similar license to this one.


Project Members

Project Leaders:

Contributors:

  • Christoph Hansen
  • Felipe 'Zimmerle' Costa
  • Franziska Bühler
  • Victor Hora

Presentation

Related Projects

Quick Download

Source Code Repo

News and Events

Mailing List

Classifications

Owasp-flagship-trans-85.png Owasp-defenders-small.png
License: ASLv2
Project Type Files CODE.jpg

<paypal>ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project</paypal>

The following tutorials will get you started with ModSecurity and the CRS v3.

These tutorials are part of a big series of Apache / ModSecurity guides published by netnea. They are written by Christian Folini.

More Information at https://modsecurity.org/crs.

ModSecurity Rules Language

What are the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rules (CRS) and why should I use them?

Using ModSecurity requires rules. In order to enable users to take full advantage of ModSecurity immediately, Trustwave's SpiderLabs is sponsoring the OWASP ModSecrity Core Rule Set (CRS) Project. Unlike intrusion detection and prevention systems which rely on signature specific to known vulnerabilities, the Core Rule Set provides generic protection from unknown vulnerabilities often found in web application that are in most cases custom coded. You may also consider writing custom rules for providing a positive security envelope to your application or critical parts of it. The Core Rule Set is heavily commented to allow it to be used as a step-by-step deployment guide for ModSecurity.

What attacks do the Core Rules protect against?

In order to provide generic web applications protection, the Core Rules use the following techniques:

  • HTTP protection - detecting violations of the HTTP protocol and a locally defined usage policy.
  • Common Web Attacks Protection - detecting common web application security attack.
  • Automation detection - Detecting bots, crawlers, scanners and other surface malicious activity.
  • Trojan Protection - Detecting access to Trojans horses.
  • Errors Hiding – Disguising error messages sent by the server

In addition the ruleset also hints at the power of ModSecurity beyond providing security by reporting access from the major search engines to your site.

How do I whitelist an IP address so it can pass through ModSecurity?

The first issue to realize is that in ModSecurity 2.0, the allow action is only applied to the current phase. This means that if a rule matches in a subsequent phase it may still take a disruptive action. The recommended rule configuration to allow a remote IP address to bypass ModSecurity rules is to do the following (where 192.168.1.100 should be substituted with the desired IP address): background-color: #ffffcc; SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.110" id:1,phase:1,nolog,pass,ctl:ruleEngine=Off

If you want to allow uninterrupted access to the remote IP address, however you still want to log rule alerts, then you can use this rule -

SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.110" phase:1,nolog,allow,ctl:ruleEngine=DetectionOnly

If you want to disable both the rule and audit engines, then you can optionally add another ctl action:

SecRule REMOTE_ADDR "@ipMatch 192.168.110" phase:1,nolog,allow,ctl:ruleEngine=Off,ctl:auditEngine=Off

How do I handle False Positives and creating Custom Rules?

It is inevitable; you will run into some False Positive hits when using web application firewalls. This is not something that is unique to ModSecurity. All web application firewalls will generate false positives from time to time. The following Blog post information will help to guide you through the process of identifying, fixing, implementing and testing new custom rules to address false positives. http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/08/modsecurity-advanced-topic-of-the-week-exception-handling.html

Will using a large amount of negative filtering rules impact performance?

Yes. Each and every rule that you implement will consume resources (RAM, CPU, etc...). The two most important factors to consider with creating ModSecurity rules are the total number of rules and the Regular Expression optimizations. A single rule with a complex regular expression is significantly faster than multiple rules with simple regular expressions. Unfortunately, it is quite easy to create inefficient RegEx patterns. Optimizing RegExs by utilizing Grouping Only/Non-Capturing Parentheses can cut the validation time by up to 50%. The Core Ruleset is optimized for performance. background-color: #ffffcc;

What is a Virtual Patch and why should I care?

Fixing identified vulnerabilities in web applications always requires time. Organizations often do not have access to a commercial application's source code and are at the vendor's mercy while waiting for a patch. Even if they have access to the code, implementing a patch in development takes time. This leaves a window of opportunity for the attacker to exploit. External patching (also called "just-in-time patching" and "virtual patching") is one of the biggest advantages of web application firewalls as they can fix this problem externally. A fix for a specific vulnerability is usually very easy to design and in most cases it can be done in less than 15 minutes.

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Virtual_Patching_Cheat_Sheet

Managing Alerts

How do I manage ModSecurity logs if I have multiple installations?

If you have more then 1 ModSecurity installation, you have undoubtedly run into issues with consolidating, analyzing and responding to alert messages. Unfortunately, the original "Serial" format of the audit log was multi-line with all records held within one file. This made remote logging difficult. What was really needed was to have a mechanism to send logs onto a centralized logging host made specifically for processing ModSecurity Alert data. This is the purpose of the mlogc program. It comes with the ModSecurity source code and can be used to send individual audit log entries to a remote host in near real-time.

Is there an open source Console to send my audit logs to?

Christian Bockermann has developed an outstanding free tool called AuditConsole that allows you to centralize and analyze remote ModSecurity audit log data.

Can I send ModSecurity alert log data through Syslog?

Yes. If you already have a central Syslog infrastructure setup and/or if you are using some sort of SIEM application, then you might want to include the short version ModSecurity alert messages that appear in the Apache error_log file. You can easily reconfigure Apache to send its error logs through Syslog onto a remote, central logging server. However, the data being forwarded is a very small subset of the entire transaction. It is only a warning message and not enough information to conduct proper incident response to determine if there was a false positive or if it was a legitimate attack. In order to determine this information, you need access to the ModSecurity Audit log files.

Project Leader

Chaim Sanders

Project Contributors

See changelog for more contributors.

Project Users

OWASP/WASC Distributed Web Honeypot Project uses the Core Rule Set - https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WASC_Distributed_Web_Honeypots_Project

cPanel distributes the OWASP CRS with their ModSecurity package - https://documentation.cpanel.net/display/CKB/OWASP+ModSecurity+CRS

Akamai's WAF Service is based on a previous version of the Core Rule Set - http://www.akamai.com/html/about/press/releases/2009/press_121409.html

CloudFlare's WAF uses the logic from the OWASP ModSecurity CRS - https://www.cloudflare.com/waf http://blog.cloudflare.com/cloudflares-new-waf-compiling-to-lua/

Verizon/EdgeCast WAF uses ModSecurity and the OWASP ModSecurity CRS - http://www.edgecast.com/services/security/#waf

Varnish Web Cache/Accelerator uses a converted version of the CRS - https://github.com/comotion/security.vcl

Project Sponsors

SpiderLabs Logo 2011.JPG

The CRS project is a small community within the bigger OWASP community. We have a successful project with a wide user base and with the CRS3 release cycle, we have put the development on new feet.

We have big plans and there is a need for all sort of contributions from people on a beginner and from people on an expert level alike.


Code : https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs
Issues : https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues
Feature Requests : https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues (interleaved the issues, look for the right tag, currently candidate issue)


Summary of GitHub Shortcuts / Bookmarks

Plans for AppSecEU 2017

See separate page: Plans for AppSecEU 2017

Archive: v3.0 Detection Concepts / Goals

This page outlines development projects which would add new functionality to ModSecurity that could be leveraged by the OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set.

These are not listed in any particular order.

  1. Add New Detection Logic
    1. Fraud Detection (Session Hijacking/CSRF/Banking Trojans)
    2. User Profiling (GeoIP/Browser Fingerprinting)
    3. HoneyTraps
  2. Increase Rule Accuracy
    1. Reduce False Positives - many users complain about the number of false positives and the negative impacts (breaking functionality) when in blocking mode
    2. Reduce False Negatives - we need to constantly improve detection so that we don't miss attacks (http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/07/modsecurity-sql-injection-challenge-lessons-learned.html)
  3. Increase Performance/Reduce Latency
    1. Utilize set-based pattern matching (@pm/@pmf) for pre-qualification of regular expression checks
    2. Optimize individual @rx SecRules into less optimized versions
    3. Review all regular expression rules for performance (non-capturing/greediness).
  4. Improve Rule Management
    1. Make it easier for user to enable/disable the desired rules for their platform
    2. Update rule formatting for easier readability
    3. Reorder/Regroup rule into new file names

Archive: Detection Logic/Flow Concepts in the Request Header Phase

This section outlines the processing flow and associated points of detection and actions taken.

  1. IP Reputation
    1. Data inspected: REMOTE_ADDR
    2. Use @rbl to check against remote RBLs
    3. Use @pmf to check a local file if bad IPs
    4. Use GeoIP Data to assign fraud scores
    5. Actions
      1. Deny
      2. Increase TX anomaly score
      3. Tag client as "suspicious" in IP collection
  2. Request Method Analysis
    1. Data inspected: REQUEST_METHOD
    2. Compare the REQUEST_METHOD specified against:
      1. Allowed global methods set by the admin in the modsecurity_crs_10_setup.conf file
      2. Request methods allowed per-resource (GET vs. POST)
    3. Actions
      1. Deny
      2. Increase TX anomaly score
      3. Tag client as "suspicious" in IP collection
  3. Request Header Analysis
    1. Data inspected: REQUESTE_HEADERS
    2. Check for existence of malicious headers (User-Agent of scanners, etc..)
    3. Check for the absence of required headers (Host, User-Agent, Accept)
    4. Request Header Ordering Anomalies detects non-browsers/bots
    5. Actions
      1. Deny
      2. Increase TX anomaly score
      3. Tag client as "suspicious" in IP collection

Involvement in the development and promotion of OWASP ModSecurity CRS is actively encouraged! You do not have to be a security expert in order to contribute. Some of the ways you can help:

  • Contribute on the mail-list by answering questions from the community
  • Report issues to our GitHub Issue tracker

The upcoming major Core Rules (CRS) release 3.0.0 is currently being developed in a separate branch on github. The release is planned for the first quarter 2016. It brings incorporation of the @detectsqli and @detectxss operators and a general reduction of false positives for default setups.

Infos about 3.0.0

Development

PROJECT INFO
What does this OWASP project offer you?
RELEASE(S) INFO
What releases are available for this project?
what is this project?
Name: OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project (home page)
Purpose: ModSecurity is an Apache web server module that provides a web application firewall engine. The ModSecurity Rules Language engine is extrememly flexible and robust and has been referred to as the "Swiss Army Knife of web application firewalls." While this is certainly true, it doesn't do much implicitly on its own and requires rules to tell it what to do. In order to enable users to take full advantage of ModSecurity out of the box, we have developed the Core Rule Set (CRS) which provides critical protections against attacks across most every web architecture.

Unlike intrusion detection and prevention systems, which rely on signatures specific to known vulnerabilities, the CRS is based on generic rules which focus on attack payload identification in order to provide protection from zero day and unknown vulnerabilities often found in web applications, which are in most cases custom coded.

License: Apache Software License v2 (ASLv2)
who is working on this project?
Project Leader(s):
how can you learn more?
Project Pamphlet: Not Yet Created
Project Presentation: View
Mailing list: Mailing List Archives
Project Roadmap: View
Main links:
Key Contacts
  • Contact the GPC to report a problem or concern about this project or to update information.
current release
ModSecurity 2.2.8 - 06/30/2013 - (download)
Release description: == Version 2.2.8 - 06/30/2013 ==

Security Fixes:

Improvements:

  • Updatd the /util directory structure
  • Added scripts to check Rule ID duplicates
  • Added script to remove v2.7 actions so older ModSecurity rules will work
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/pull/43
  • Added new PHP rule (958977) to detect PHP exploits (Plesk 0-day from king cope)
 - http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Jun/21
 - http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2013/06/honeypot-alert-active-exploits-attempts-for-plesk-vulnerability-.html


Bug Fixes:

  • fix 950901 - word boundary added
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/pull/48
  • fix regex error
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/pull/44
  • Updated the Regex in 981244 to include word boundaries
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/36
  • Problem with Regression Test (Invalid use of backslash) - Rule 960911 - Test2
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/34
  • ModSecurity: No action id present within the rule - ignore_static.conf
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/17
  • "Bad robots" rule blocks all Java applets on Windows XP machines
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/16
  • duplicated rules id 981173
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs/issues/18
Rating: Projects/OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project/GPC/Assessment/ModSecurity 2.2.8
last reviewed release
ModSecurity 2.0.6 - 2010-02-26 - (download)
Release description: ModSecurity is a web application firewall that can work either embedded or as a reverse proxy. It provides protection from a range of attacks against web applications and allows for HTTP traffic monitoring, logging and real-time analysis.
Rating: Greenlight.pngGreenlight.pngGreenlight.png Stable Release - Assessment Details


other releases
}

The CRS3 poster was designed by Hugo Costa, OWASP's graphical designer. It can be reused under a CC BY-ND license.

The large version has a 300 dpi resolution, big enough to be printed in A2, A1, or even A0 format. The format is the standard poster size format 500mm x 700mm (19.68in x 27.56in).


CRS3-movie-poster-small.jpg