Difference between revisions of "Authentication Cheat Sheet"
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=== HTTP Only ===
=== HTTP Only ===
The HTTP only directive, also sent to the browser can project the cookie from
The HTTP only directive, also sent to the browser can project the cookie from manupulation. This is a compensating control against XSS cookie attacks.
=== HTTP GET Vs POST ===
=== HTTP GET Vs POST ===
Revision as of 07:02, 7 August 2010
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Authentication General Guidelines
- 2.1 Implement Proper Password Strength Controls
- 2.2 Implement Secure Password Recovery Mechanism
- 2.3 Utilize Multi-Factor Authentication
- 2.4 Authentication and Error Messages
- 2.5 Transmit Passwords Only Over TLS
- 2.6 Implement Account Lockout
- 3 Session Management General Guidelines
- 4 Related Articles
- 5 References
- 6 Authors and Primary Editors
Authentication is the process of verification that an individual or an entity is who it claims to be. Authentication is commonly performed by submitting a user name or ID and one or more items of private information that only a given user should know.
Session Management is a process by which a server maintains the state of an entity interacting with it. This is required for a server to remember how to react to subsiquent requests throughout a transaction. Sessions are maintained on the server by a session identifier which can be passed back and forward between the client and server when mtransmitting and receiving requests. Sessions should be unique per user and computationally very difficult to predict.
For more information on Authentication, please see the OWASP Guide to Authentication page.
Authentication General Guidelines
Implement Proper Password Strength Controls
A key concern when using passwords for authentication is password strength. A "strong" password policy makes it difficult or even improbable for one to guess the password either by using manual or automated means. The following characteristics define strong a strong password:
The longer the password the more combinations possible combinations of characters exist and is hence more difficult to guess.
Important applications: Minimum of 6 characters in length.
Critical applications: Minimum of 8 characters in length. (consider multi-factor authentication)
Highly critical applications: Consider multi-factor authentication
Passwords should be checked for the following composition or a variance of such:
- at least: 1 uppercase character (A-Z)
- at least: 1 lowercase character (a-z)
- at least: 1 digit (0-9)
- at least one special character (!"£$%&...)
- a defined minimum length (e.g. 8 chars)
- a defined maximum length (as with all external input)
- no contiguous characters (e.g. 123abcd)
- not more than 2 identical characters in a row (1111)
Implement Secure Password Recovery Mechanism
It is common for an application to have a mechanism that provides a means for a user to gain access to their account in the event they forget their password. Password recovery systems are difficult to secure against abuse, circumvention. The best way is to keep them as simple as possible.
Weaknesses with secret questions are common;
Weakness may be that the security question is too easy to guess or find an answer to E.g. Car, Date of Birth (DOB), Colour Such question have a a finite sample space and are easily brute forced/guessed.
Delivery Mechanisims / Implementation weakness
Common issues with a reset password delivery are
Email: Setting the email address to that which is not the email address of the user for which the password is to be reset.
- Password Reset Rate
Limiting the rate at which password reset requests are processed in order to limit hijacking and brute force attempts.
- Authentication: Password recovery mechanism relies only on something the user knows and not something the user has; email account, token, multifactor.
Utilize Multi-Factor Authentication
Multifactor factor authentication is using more than one of:
- Something you know (account details or passwords)
- Something you have (tokens or mobile phones)
- Something you are (biometrics)
to logon or process a transaction.
Authentication schemes such as One Time Passwords (OTP) implemented using a hardware token can also be key in fighting attacks such as CSRF and client-side malware.
Authentication and Error Messages
Incorrectly implemented error messages in the case of authentication functionality can be used for the purposes of user ID and password enumeration.
An application should respond (both HTTP and HTML) in a generic manner which is not unique to the error condition or authentication failure.
An application should respond with a generic error message regardless if the user ID or password was incorrect. It should also no give any indication to the status of an account if it exists.
Incorrect responses examples
- "Login for User foo: invalid password"
- "Login failed, invalid user ID"
- "Login failed; account disabled"
- "login failed; this user is not active"
Correct response example
- "Login failed; Invalid user ID or password"
The correct response does not indicate if the user ID or password is the incorrect parameter and hence inferring a valid user ID.
Error Codes and URL's
The application may return a different HTTP Error code depending on the authentication attempt response. It may respond with a 200 for a positive result and a 403 for a negative result. Even though a generc error page is shown to a user the HTTP response code may differ which can indicate a signature.
Transmit Passwords Only Over TLS
See: "Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet"
"The login page and all subsequent authenticated pages must be exclusively accessed over TLS. The initial login page, referred to as the "login landing page", must be served over TLS. Failure to utilize TLS for the login landing page allows an attacker to modify the login form action, causing the user's credentials to be posted to an arbitrary location. Failure to utilize TLS for authenticated pages after the login enables an attacker to view the unencrypted session ID and compromise the user's authenticated session."
Implement Account Lockout
If an attacker is able to guess passwords without the account becoming disabled due to failed authentication attempts, this provides the opportunity of the attacked to continue with a brute force attack until the account is compromised.
Automating brute-force/password guessing attacks on web applications is a trivial challenge. Password lockout mechanisms should be employed that lock out an account if more than a preset number of unsuccessful login attempts are made.
Password lockout mechanisms do have a logical weakness, however. It is possible for an attacker to attempt a large number of authentication attempts on known account names resulting in locking out entire blocks of application users accounts.
Given that the intent of a password lockout system is to protect from brute-force attacks, a sensible strategy is to lockout accounts for a number of hours. This significantly slows down attackers, while allowing the accounts to be open for legitimate users.
See also "Reverse Brute-force" Reverse_Brute_Force
Session Management General Guidelines
Transmit Session ID's Only Over TLS
Session ID's should be transmitted over a secure TLS channel.
A browser directive, the secure flag, for the cookie exists which instructs the browser at the set-cookie action only to send over a secure channel.
This prevents attacks such as Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) and surf jacking attacks.
Ensure Session ID's are Cryptographically Strong and Random
Session ID's should be large and random enough such that they are not easily predicted. This may lead to session hijacking and identity theft.
Be sure the session ID used has the following traits at a minimum:
- Session identifiers should be at least 128 bits long to prevent brute-force session guessing attacks.
- All session identifiers should be sufficiently randomized so as to not be guessable.
- All session identifiers should use the largest character set available to it.
Implement Idle And Absolute Timeout
Session Idle Timeout
All browser sessions should implement an inactivity timeout.
An inactivity timeout closes/invalidates a session upon a period of inactivity (Server has not received a request for a given session ID) has been reached.
Session Absolute Timeout
Regardless of session/user activity is is recommended to enforce a session timeout "maximum time limit" if possible. This maximum session time invalidates the users session and forces them to log into the application again by re-authentication. If a session was hijacked via cookie theft, an absolute timeout may limit exposure to the user.
If the site requires operation over SSL ensure the secure flag is set upon the set-cookie directive sent the to the browser.
HTTP GET Vs POST
Sending any sensitive data over a query string, using HTTP GET can give rise to information leakage at points through the traffic path or at either end of the SSL tunnel:
E.g. Logs (firewall, Router, TLS tunnel terminator, App/web server).
Query strings can also be cached in a browser's history.
Authentication over Query String regardless of the use of SSL is not recommended.
OWASP Cheat Sheets Project Homepage
Developer Cheat Sheets (Builder)
- Authentication Cheat Sheet
- Choosing and Using Security Questions Cheat Sheet
- Clickjacking Defense Cheat Sheet
- C-Based Toolchain Hardening Cheat Sheet
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Cryptographic Storage Cheat Sheet
- DOM based XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Forgot Password Cheat Sheet
- HTML5 Security Cheat Sheet
- Input Validation Cheat Sheet
- JAAS Cheat Sheet
- Logging Cheat Sheet
- .NET Security Cheat Sheet
- Password Storage Cheat Sheet
- Pinning Cheat Sheet
- Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet
- Ruby on Rails Cheatsheet
- REST Security Cheat Sheet
- Session Management Cheat Sheet
- SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet
- Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Cheat Sheet
- User Privacy Protection Cheat Sheet
- Web Service Security Cheat Sheet
- XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet
Assessment Cheat Sheets (Breaker)
Mobile Cheat Sheets
OpSec Cheat Sheets (Defender)
Draft Cheat Sheets
- OWASP Top Ten Cheat Sheet
- Access Control Cheat Sheet
- Application Security Architecture Cheat Sheet
- Business Logic Security Cheat Sheet
- PHP Security Cheat Sheet
- Secure Coding Cheat Sheet
- Secure SDLC Cheat Sheet
- Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet
- Web Application Security Testing Cheat Sheet
- Grails Secure Code Review Cheat Sheet
- IOS Application Security Testing Cheat Sheet
- Key Management Cheat Sheet
- Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Content Security Policy Cheat Sheet
Authors and Primary Editors
Eoin Keary eoinkeary[at]owasp.org