



**OWASP**

The Open Web Application Security Project

# Threat Modelling - hacking the design

Mustafa Kasmani

Senior Cyber Security Consultant, Worldpay



- 12 years at Worldpay:
  - Test (payment gateway) —> AppSec (CyberSecurity Consulting)  
a division of a major bank —> FTSE 100 —> merger talks...
- Worldpay - leader in global payments, 15 billion transactions processed in 146 countries, 126 currencies, 300+ APM's.
- Global brands, 30 years of payments history, 5000+ colleagues across 25 offices in 13 countries.
- **Change is the only constant** - Transformation, Innovation & culture



- New office: Fintech Hub - complementing other sites in Romania.
- Partnering with Endava - building engineering capability, including Security Specialisms
- **Open roles** - meet us at the stand to find out more.



**OWASP**

The Open Web Application Security Project

Culture

Process

Tools

# What is Threat Modelling ?



- *Threat modelling is a process by which potential threats can be identified, enumerated, and prioritised – all from a hypothetical attacker’s point of view.*
  - *The purpose of threat modelling is to provide defenders with a systematic analysis of the probable attacker’s profile, the most likely attack vectors, and the assets most desired by an attacker.*
  - *Threat modelling answers the questions “Where are the high-value assets?” “Where am I most vulnerable to attack?” “What are the most relevant threats?” “Is there an attack vector that might go unnoticed?”*
- Wikipedia - ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat\\_model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_model))

# 4 key questions



## **What are you building ?**

- Model system —> DFD's, sequence flows, API contracts, etc.

## **What can go wrong ?**

- Identify threats —> STRIDE threat analysis

## **What should be done about it ?**

- Address threats —> Risk analysis

## **Is the threat analysis correct ?**

- Validate analysis —> Testing of controls

# Why should it be done ?



- Analyse the system from an **attackers point of view**, threat actors & motives, and enumerate assets to protect.
- Find flaws in the design and remediate when **easiest & cheapest** to do so.
- Create a **common understanding** of the system design amongst the architects, designers, developers, testers & security folk.
- Culture over Process over Tools: Security Maturity & Worldpay experiences





- The more **perspectives** you get into your threat model means better protection can be designed to the system.
- Certain features can become vulnerabilities when used by people with malicious intent.
- **Balance** between security -vs- usability -vs- cost -vs- other competing resources (opportunity cost).
- Build up library of patterns for which **risks** are known, understood & accepted by the stakeholders.
- Avoid **technical debt** being built up through better understanding prior to new features being added



# Who should be involved ?



- Architects, Designers, Developers, Testers, Security, + Anyone who has an interest in it:
  - Different perspectives - business fraud (operational processes / external entities), not just technical threats
- Security Champions in the team: Link between Development & Security:
  - scale AppSec capabilities, understand the system, maintain risk log, point of contact.



- As a security architect,
  - I want to do a threat model of ...
  - So that I can design effective security controls mitigate the threats identified in the threat model.
  
- As a security tester,
  - I want to create a library of security tests for ...
  - So that I can validate that the security controls in place are mitigating the threats identified in the threat model.

# When should it be done ?



- As early as possible !
- Influence direction, technology choice, system design
- Iterative - can re-visit once further details are known
- “The best time to plant an oak tree was 20 years ago. The next best time is now.” — wise words

# How...?



## OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

- STRIDE - Microsoft Methodology (c.1999)
  - Explore this further later on in the workshop
- PASTA - (Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis)
- VAST - (Visual Agile and Simple Threat Modelling)



## OWASP

The Open Web Application Security Project

- use a methodology for structure,
- But focus on how to find good threats, rather than the merits of one approach over another
  - each has its own strengths & weaknesses
- appropriate to what is being built, who is building it (skill-set), the prevalent risk appetite & culture



- Practical exercise of threat modelling a fictitious payments web application:
  - payments page, merchant portal, administration
  - actors, assets, distributed architecture
  
- Objective: put theory into practice

# What are you building ?



- Model the system - (appropriate level of detail)
- Trust boundaries -vs- Attack surface
- Data - in transit / on disk / in memory
- Actors - benign / malicious, internal / external, employees, suppliers / customers / partners / etc.
- Assets - physical, logical, configuration, code, intellectual property, API contract (e.g. Swagger spec)



# Model your system



- Data-Flow Diagrams
- Sequence Interaction Diagrams
- API contracts / Swagger definitions
  
- Keep It Simple - easy to understand
- Complexity is the enemy of Security

# What can go wrong ?



- Map attack surface
- Actors -vs- Motives
- STRIDE threat analysis
- Risk analysis
- Controls testing

# STRIDE threat analysis



- **Spoofing** - pretending to be someone / something else
- **Tampering** - modifying something that should not be modified
- **Repudiation** - denial of something that was done (true or not)
- **Information disclosure** - divulge information that should not be divulged, a breach of confidentiality
- **Denial of service** - prevent a system or service from being available or fulfilling its purpose
- **Elevation of privilege** - executing something without being allowed to do so

# What should be done ?



Spoofing	<b>Authentication</b>	passwords, certs, MFA, signatures, tokens
Tampering	<b>Integrity</b>	hashes, signatures, ACLs
Repudiation	<b>Non-Repudiation</b>	logs, auditing, hashes, signatures
Information disclosure	<b>Confidentiality</b>	encryption, ACLs
Denial of service	<b>Availability</b>	ACLs, quotas, throttling, circuit breaks
Elevation of privilege	<b>Authorisation</b>	input validation, ACLs

# Examples



**OWASP**

The Open Web Application Security Project

- CCleaner



- Ranking of issues - risk assessment
- SDLC - DevSecOps -> iterative on-going assessment
- keep the security culture on-going



- Scoping assessments, targeted testing
  - Understand the system - testers get involved earlier on in the design.
  - Later tests are more targeted in approach, validation of controls rather than find new issues
  - Security built in right from the outset rather than being bolted on at the end - saves time & money !





**OWASP**

The Open Web Application Security Project

- What we've found
- Experience at Worldpay - culture, what works in one place may not work in another - same for different teams.
- Iterative process - get better over time, understand what works what doesn't
- Resistive teams - how to deal with them: hostile, resistive, unaware, enthusiastic
- Management

# Further reading



**OWASP**

The Open Web Application Security Project

- 'Threat Modeling: Designing for Security - Adam Shostack, (Wiley, 2014)

Thank you



**OWASP**

The Open Web Application Security Project

Any questions ?



**OWASP**

The Open Web Application Security Project

# Threat Modelling a fictitious payment web application - ( workshop )

**Mustafa Kasmani**

Senior Cyber Security Consultant,



- As an Application Security Consultant,
- assess the design of this application,
- so that the risk profile of it can be established and that mitigating action can be taken