About Me

- Robert “RSnake” Hansen - CEO
- SecTheory LLC
  - Bespoke Boutique Internet Security
    - Web Application/Browser Security
    - Network/OS Security
    - Advisory capacity to VCs/start-ups
    - http://www.sectheory.com/
- Founded the web application security lab
  - http://ha.ckers.org/ - the lab
  - http://sla.ckers.org/ - the forum
Why?

- Because I use the Internet
- Because I’m a target
- Because most people don’t know
- Because it’s a fun conversation to have over drinks with security guys
- Maybe/hopefully you’ll continue this conversation instead of just arguing!
Ground Rules

- Must be non-obvious and must be directly related to the Internet. Not:
  - ... the President or any other government official
  - ... or someone involved with SCADA Systems/Brick and mortar
- Must be in control of some infrastructure or software, etc....
- Must have the largest or widest negative impact possible for the least amount of work and least likelihood of being stopped
- No magic – must be real and dangerous
- They can’t be “bad” people
- You can’t take this list too seriously
How I Got Started

- Started thinking about core technologies that everything relies on.
- Made a big list
- Shopped it around to dozens of security experts
- Assigned an arbitrary, unscientific, hand-wavy, risk-rating system of my own design
- Ranked them in order of how scary they are to me personally
Let’s Do This!
John Doe at C|Net

Job: Network Engineer

Why: Controls com.com

Impact: Largest collection point of typo traffic both for web and email.

- csuchico.com story...
- I have attempted this sort of squatting before with .xn--g6w251d to no avail – very limited possibilities here
- Doesn’t require anything overt or even indefensible.
#9

- **Giorgio Maone of NoScript**
- **Job:** Consultant
- **Why:** Controls NoScript
- **Impact:** Nearly every security researcher on the planet – complete compromise. In general the most paranoid people on earth would be compromised.
  - Builds arbitrary whitelists (ebay.com)
  - Has changed functionality to subvert Adblock Plus
Eddy Nigg at StartCom Ltd…
- or John Doe at SSL Cert Reseller

Job: Developer/QA

Why: Has access to create wildcard SSL certs for any domain

Impact: Would allow an attacker to steal any information they were able to man in the middle.
- Previously demonstrated bad security
- Much smaller and therefore less controlled than Verisign or Thawt, etc…
John Doe at Authorize.net

Job: Network admin/Server admin

Why: Has the ability to see the vast majority of online transactions.

Impact: Would allow an attacker to get PII and credit card information for the bulk of the US online shopping population and many international shoppers as well

- Just a Merchant Bank
- Regulated, but not like Visa/MC, etc…
- Blackmail opportunities galore!
John Doe at Mozilla

Job: Has check-in access

Why: Has the ability to change functionality within the browser, including installing new SSL certs.

Impact: Would allow the attacker to man in the middle and read all SSL traffic.

- Almost no documentation
- The verification process is very open and subject to tampering – meaning the update mechanism isn’t probably much better.
Chirag and Floyd at Adwords

Job: Whomever checks in code

Why: Has access to millions of websites because it is XSS

Impact: Can be leveraged for stealing cookies and hijacking web functionality

- Is embedded in millions of web pages
- Is already obfuscated heavily
- Is seen daily by the bulk of the Internet population
- Begs the question about CDNs in particular
John Doe at Google’s Postini
Job: Programmer/Server admin
Why: Controls and can view the bulk of the world’s email - including Gmail
Impact: Would enable attacker to steal credentials, spoof conversations, tamper with data, introduce malware, etc…
  - More dangerous than Adwords because it’s passive
  - Is the biggest in terms of amount of traffic it sees
  - Does tons of processing already and is delegated authority to reject email as it sees fit
John Doe at 1 Wilshire
Job: NOC Monkey
Why: One of the largest peering centers on the west code
Impact: Can tamper with machines, install malware, inject malicious traffic, intercept communications etc…
  - Most amount of data links in one physical location
  - CIA has already demonstrated interest in choke points using Arbor like infrastructure in San Francisco as outing by Mark Klein
- John Doe at gtei.net
- Job: Network Admin/Server Admin
- Why: Controls 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3
- Impact: Can be used to subvert a huge chunk of Internet traffic by giving erroneous DNS answers.
  - Used by default in many devices
  - Used by tons of individuals and companies who are lazy
  - Can be used in very targeted attacks for a very short period of time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Current Tbl</th>
<th>Response Time (ms)</th>
<th>Packet Loss (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2.2</td>
<td>California (Los Angeles)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2.3</td>
<td>Canada (Edmonton)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2.4</td>
<td>Canada (Vancouver)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.2.5</td>
<td>Colorado (Denver)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.2.6</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
John Doe at iDefense

Job: Security Engineer/Consultant

Why: Consults for and is owned by Verisign, who owns Network Solutions, who controls authoritative DNS for “.com”

Impact: Would allow the bulk of the Internet traffic to be modified

- Heavily monitored and protected but still could lead to temporary and targeted compromise
- More dangerous than 4.2.2.2 because it controls all of .com and not just a subset of users
Disappointed? Upset?

THIS ROOM IS FULL OF PEOPLE WHO CARE THAT YOUR FEELINGS ARE HURT.
The List

1. John Doe at iDefense
2. John Doe at gtei.net
3. John Doe at 45 Freemont
4. John Doe at Google Postini
5. Chirag and Floyd at Google Adwords
6. John Doe at Mozilla
7. John Doe at Authorize.net
8. Eddy Nigg at StartCom Ltd
9. Giorgio Maone at NoScript
10. John Doe at C|Net
Questions/Comments?

- Robert Hansen
  - Robert _at_ sectheory d0t c0m
  - http://www.sectheory.com/
  - http://ha.ckers.org/
  - Detecting Malice
    - http://www.detectmalice.com/
  - XSS Book: XSS Exploits and Defense
    - ISBN: 1597491543