CRV2 ClientSideCodeHTML5

=Code review on HTML5=

HTML5 was created to replace HTLML4, XHTML and the HTML DOM Level 2. Main purposes of this new standard is to provide dynamic content without the use of extra proprietary plugins such as Silverlight. This allows designers and developers to create exceptional sites providing a great user experience without having to install any additional plug-ins into the browser. Ideally users should have the latest web browser installed but this does not happens as regularly as security experts advice, therefore the website should implement 2 layer controls, one layer independent from Browser type, second, as an additional control.

What and where to look for in the code
= Communication APIs =

Web Messaging
otherWindow.postMessage(message, targetOrigin, [transfer]);

Web Messaging (also known as Cross Domain Messaging) provides a means of messaging between documents from different origins in a way that is generally safer than the multiple hacks used in the past to accomplish this task. However, there are still some recommendations to keep in mind:


 * When posting a message, explicitly state the expected origin as the second argument to postMessage rather than * in order to prevent sending the message to an unknown origin after a redirect or some other means of the target window's origin changing.
 * The receiving page should always:
 * Check the origin attribute of the sender to verify the data is originating from the expected location.
 * Perform input validation on the data attribute of the event to ensure that it's in the desired format.
 * Don't assume you have control over the data attribute. A single Cross Site Scripting flaw in the sending page allows an attacker to send messages of any given format.
 * Both pages should only interpret the exchanged messages as data. Never evaluate passed messages as code (e.g. via eval) or insert it to a page DOM (e.g. via innerHTML), as that would create a DOM-based XSS vulnerability.
 * To assign the data value to an element, instead of using a insecure method like element.innerHTML = data;, use the safer option: element.textContent = data;</tt>
 * Check the origin properly exactly to match the FQDN(s) you expect. Note that the following code:  if(message.orgin.indexOf(".owasp.org")!=-1) { /* ... */ }</tt> is very insecure and will not have the desired behavior as www.owasp.org.attacker.com</tt> will match.
 * If you need to embed external content/untrusted gadgets and allow user-controlled scripts (which is highly discouraged), consider using a JavaScript rewriting framework such as Google's Caja or check the information on |sandboxed frames.

Cross Origin Resource Sharing
var myRequest = new XMLHttpRequest; void open(  DOMString method,   DOMString url,   optional boolean async,   optional DOMString user,   optional DOMString password ); xmlhttp.open("GET","xmlhttp_info.txt",true); xmlhttp.open.call(this, method, rewrittenUrl, async, user, pass);


 * Validate URLs passed to XMLHttpRequest.open</tt>. Current browsers allow these URLs to be cross domain; this behavior can lead to code injection by a remote attacker. Pay extra attention to absolute URLs.
 * Ensure that URLs responding with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *</tt> do not include any sensitive content or information that might aid attacker in further attacks. Use the Access-Control-Allow-Origin</tt> header only on chosen URLs that need to be accessed cross-domain. Don't use the header for the whole domain.
 * Allow only selected, trusted domains in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin</tt> header. Prefer whitelisting domains over blacklisting or allowing any domain (do not use *</tt> wildcard nor blindly return the Origin</tt> header content without any checks).
 * Keep in mind that CORS does not prevent the requested data from going to an unauthenticated location. It's still important for the server to perform usual Cross-Site Request Forgery prevention.
 * While the RFC recommends a pre-flight request with the OPTIONS</tt> verb, current implementations might not perform this request, so it's important that "ordinary" (GET</tt> and POST</tt>) requests perform any access control necessary.
 * Discard requests received over plain HTTP with HTTPS origins to prevent mixed content bugs.
 * Don't rely only on the Origin header for Access Control checks. Browser always sends this header in CORS requests, but may be spoofed outside the browser. Application-level protocols should be used to protect sensitive data.

WebSockets

 * Drop backward compatibility in implemented client/servers and use only protocol versions above hybi-00. Popular Hixie-76 version (hiby-00) and older are outdated and insecure.
 * The recommended version supported in latest versions of all current browsers is rfc6455 RFC 6455 (supported by Firefox 11+, Chrome 16+, Safari 6, Opera 12.50, and IE10).
 * While it's relatively easy to tunnel TCP services through WebSockets (e.g. VNC, FTP), doing so enables access to these tunneled services for the in-browser attacker in case of a Cross Site Scripting attack. These services might also be called directly from a malicious page or program.
 * The protocol doesn't handle authorization and/or authentication. Application-level protocols should handle that separately in case sensitive data is being transferred.
 * Process the messages received by the websocket as data. Don't try to assign it directly to the DOM nor evaluate as code. If the response is JSON, never use the insecure eval function; use the safe option JSON.parse instead.
 * Endpoints exposed through the ws://</tt> protocol are easily reversible to plain text. Only wss://</tt> (WebSockets over SSL/TLS) should be used for protection against Man-In-The-Middle attacks.
 * Spoofing the client is possible outside a browser, so the WebSockets server should be able to handle incorrect/malicious input. Always validate input coming from the remote site, as it might have been altered.
 * When implementing servers, check the Origin:</tt> header in the Websockets handshake. Though it might be spoofed outside a browser, browsers always add the Origin of the page that initiated the Websockets connection.
 * As a WebSockets client in a browser is accessible through JavaScript calls, all Websockets communication can be spoofed or hijacked through Cross Site Scripting. Always validate data coming through a WebSockets connection.

The following is sample code of an application using Web Sockets [Constructor(in DOMString url, optional in DOMString protocol)] interface WebSocket { readonly attribute DOMString URL; // ready state const unsigned short CONNECTING = 0; const unsigned short OPEN = 1; const unsigned short CLOSED = 2; readonly attribute unsigned short readyState; readonly attribute unsigned long bufferedAmount; // networking attribute Function onopen; attribute Function onmessage; attribute Function onclose; boolean send(in DOMString data); void close; }; WebSocket implements EventTarget;

var myWebSocket = new WebSocket("ws://www.websockets.org");

myWebSocket.onopen = function(evt) { alert("Connection open ..."); }; myWebSocket.onmessage = function(evt) { alert( "Received Message: " + evt.data); }; myWebSocket.onclose = function(evt) { alert("Connection closed."); };

Server-Sent Events

 * Validate URLs passed to the EventSource</tt> constructor, even though only same-origin URLs are allowed.
 * As mentioned before, process the messages (<tt>event.data</tt>) as data and never evaluate the content as HTML or script code.
 * Always check the origin attribute of the message (<tt>event.origin</tt>) to ensure the message is coming from a trusted domain. Use a whitel

Many vulnerabilities are indeed patched through the implementation of proper HTTP Headers. Part of these vulnerabilities include Cross Site Scripting, Click jacking and Cross Site Forgery among others. For more info regarding these vulnerabilities, please consult the OWASP Top 10. The code reviewer must focus on looking for specific implementation of certain features and code

Client Side: Disable scripts
A known client side protection on the browser is the disabling of scripts. The code should consider this scenarios and implement proper code to allow the user understand why the code does not work properly on his browser, if this is the case

document.write("Hi!") browser does not support JavaScript!

Server side code implementation
Implementation of the code is also dependent on the type of web server technology used, therefore the code might be implemented in configuration files on the server side scripts (for example apache does this in the httpd.conf file). Header always append X-Frame-Options SAMEORIGIN

PHP
<?php header("X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN"); ?>

IIS (.NET)
<system.webServer> ...

<httpProtocol> <customHeaders> <add name="X-Frame-Options" value="SAMEORIGIN" /> </customHeaders> </httpProtocol>

... </system.webServer>

Ruby On Rails
Configure config/application.rb fil with the folowing code

config.action_dispatch.default_headers.merge!({'X-Frame-Options' => 'ALLOWALL'})

Java (Spring Framework)
Add security dependencies by configuring this correctly in the pom.xml configuration file pom.xml

<groupId>org.springframework.security</groupId> <artifactId>spring-security-web</artifactId> 3.2.3.RELEASE <groupId>org.springframework.security</groupId> <artifactId>spring-security-config</artifactId> 3.2.3.RELEASE

Implementation of HTML5 Sandbox attribute
It is possible to set the sandbox attribute and this helps set restrictions on content hosted in the iframe. The value must be correctly implemented by setting an unordered unique space-separated token which are ASCII case sensitive, these are allow-forms, allow-pointer-lock, allow-popups, allow-same-origin, allow-scripts, and allow-top-navigation.

Modern browsers including Chrome, Firefox, and IE10 Platform Preview are based on the W3C IFrame Sandbox Attribute.

<iframe src="dontrtustthis.html" sandbox>

Keep in mind that these security restrictions can be easily lifted by placing allow tokens in the attributes value such as this:

<iframe src=" dontrtustthis.html" sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms">

For more info on correct implementation of HTML5 Sandbox code please visit http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/the-iframe-element.html#the-iframe-element