OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications

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Automated Threats to Web Applications
The OWASP Automated Threats to Web Applications Project has completed a review of reports, academic and other papers, news stories and vulnerability taxonomies/listings to identify, name and classify these scenarios – automated by software causing a divergence from accepted behavior producing one or more undesirable effects on a web application, but excluding tool-based exploitation of single-issue vulnerabilities.. The initial objective was to produce an ontology providing a common language for developers, architects, operators, business owners, security engineers, purchasers and suppliers/ vendors, to facilitate clear communication and help tackle the issues. The project also intends to identify symptoms, mitigations and controls in this problem area. Like all OWASP outputs, everything is free and published using an open source license.

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Description
Web applications are subjected to unwanted automated usage – day in, day out. Often these events relate to misuse of inherent valid functionality, rather than the attempted exploitation of unmitigated vulnerabilities. Also, excessive misuse is commonly mistakenly reported as application denial-of-service (DoS) like HTTP-flooding, when in fact the DoS is a side-effect instead of the primary intent. Frequently these have sector-specific names. Most of these problems seen regularly by web application owners are not listed in any OWASP Top Ten or other top issue list. Furthermore, they are not enumerated or defined adequately in existing dictionaries. These factors have contributed to inadequate visibility, and an inconsistency in naming such threats, with a consequent lack of clarity in attempts to address the issues.

Without sharing a common language between devops, architects, business owners, security engineers, purchasers and suppliers/vendors, everyone has to make extra effort to communicate clearly. Misunderstandings can be costly. The adverse impacts affect the privacy and security of individuals as well as the security of the applications and related system components.

Automated Threats
The list of threat events, defined in full in the, is:

Licensing
All the materials are free to use. They are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 license, so you can copy, distribute and transmit the work, and you can adapt it, and use it commercially, but all provided that you attribute the work and if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under the same or similar license to this one.

&copy; OWASP Foundation


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What Is This?
Information and resources to help web application owners defend against automated threats

What Isn't It?

 * Another vulnerability list
 * Threat modelling
 * Attack trees
 * Non web
 * Non application

Project Objective
This project brings together research and analysis of real world automated attacks against web applications, to produce documentation to assist operators defend against these threats. Sector-specific guidance will be available.

Project Leader
[mailto:colin.watson@owasp.org Colin Watson]

Related Projects

 * OWASP WASC Web Hacking Incidents Database Project
 * OWASP AppSensor Project
 * OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project


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News and Events

 * [26 Oct 2015] v1.01 handbook published
 * [24 Sep 2015] Presentation at AppSec USA 2015
 * [30 Jul 2015] v1.00 handbook published
 * [20 May 2015] Meeting at project summit in Amsterdam
 * [12 May 2015] Discussion document published
 * [27 Apr 2015] Final summary of research published
 * [21 Apr 2015] Notice in OWASP Connector

In Print


The Automated Threat Handbook can be purchased at cost as a print on demand book.

Classifications

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= Scope and Definitions =

Scope
The aim was to create a listing of vendor-neutral and technology agnostic terms that describe real-world automated threats to web applications, at a level of abstraction that application owners can relate to. These terms are threat events to web applications undertaken using automated actions.

The focus is on abuse of functionality - misuse of inherent functionality and related design flaws, some of which are also referred to as business logic flaws. There is almost no focus on implementation bugs. It is not that the latter are not the target for attacks, but there is much more knowledge published in that area with a greater agreement on terminology. All the scenarios identified must require the web to exist for the threat to be materialised. Many of the scenarios have impacts upon the organisation that owns or operates web applications, but some scenarios have impacts more focused on individuals or other bodies. An attack that can be achieved without the web is out of scope.

Automated Threats to Web Applications
Threat events to web applications undertaken using automated actions.

An attack that can be achieved without the web is out of scope.

Glossary

 * Action
 * An act taken against an asset by a threat agent. Requires first that contact occurs between the asset and threat agent (Ref 1)


 * Application
 * Software that performs a business process i.e. not system software
 * A software program hosted by an information system (Ref 2)


 * Application layer
 * "Layer 7” in the OSI model (Ref 3) and “application layer” in the TCP/IP model (Ref 4)


 * Threat
 * Anything that is capable of acting in a manner resulting in harm to an asset and/or organization; for example, acts of God (weather, geological events, etc.); malicious actors; errors; failures (Ref 1)


 * Threat Agent
 * Any agent (e.g., object, substance, human, etc.) that is capable of acting against an asset in a manner that can result in harm (Ref 1)


 * Threat Event
 * Occurs when a threat agent acts against an asset (Ref 1)


 * Web
 * The World Wide Web (WWW, or simply Web) is an information space in which the items of interest, referred to as resources, are identified by global identifiers called Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) (Ref 5)
 * The first three specifications for Web technologies defined URLs, HTTP, and HTML (Ref 6)


 * Web application
 * An application delivered over the web

Glossary references:
 * 1) Risk Taxonomy, Technical Standard, The Open Group, 2009
 * 2) NISTIR 7298 rev 2, NIST
 * 3) OSI model, Wikipedia
 * 4) TCP/IP model, Wikipedia
 * 5) Architecture of the World Wide Web, Volume One, W3C
 * 6) Help and FAQ, W3C

=Use Case Scanarios=

The following scenarios and organisation names are completely fictitious.

Defining application development security requirements
Cinnaminta SpA intends to build and launch a new multi-lingual and multi-currency ecommerce website. The development will be outsourced and Cinnaminta has been working on the functional design document. Among many other requirements, the application security specification requires that the website must not include any vulnerabilities identified in PCI DSS v3.1 Requirement 6.5, nor any other vulnerabilities that could affect the protection of payment cardholder data. Cinnaminta specifies that the website's payment functions must not be susceptible to the threat events OAT-001 Carding or OAT-010 Card Cracking as defined in the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook. In addition, the application must interact with the company's existing fraud detection system to counter OAT-012 Cashing Out. The requirements are specified in terms of these threat events, rather than particular product or service categories. Development houses responding to the call for bids use the ontology to focus their answers to these aspects appropriately.

Sharing intelligence within a sector
Unlimited Innovations Inc develops and supports patient-facing software solutions to a range of healthcare providers, many of which participate in the National Health Service Cyber Intelligence Sharing Center (NHS-CISC). Unlimited Innovations already builds continuous monitoring capabilities into its software and decides to provide an optional enhancement so that customers could choose to share their misuse event data with each other, to benefit from the combined threat intelligence. Rather than sharing large quantities of low-level data, Unlimited Innovations aggregates information and broadcasts validated and categorised threat data amongst the participating organisations. Automation attacks are classified according to the threat events defined in the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook so that each receiving party understands the nature of the threat. Even organisations that do not want to take part in this information sharing can benefit, since their own categorised information is made available to internal business management in the form of an easy-to-comprehend monitoring dashboard. The information gathered can also be fed into their other business information management systems to help improve patient service.

Exchanging threat data between CERTs
National Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) recognise that sharing of local information can contribute to worldwide prevention of cyber attacks. Despite advances in cooperation between CERTs, anything to increase continuity and interoperability, such as standards for data exchange, is encouraged. CERT Zog is concerned about the sparsity of application-specific data it receives, and also the classification of that data. It has a particular concern about attacks and breaches that affect sectors defined in Zog's 2015 national cyber security strategy. CERT Zog and its neighbour CERT Tarset agree to tag threat events using the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook in order to add greater context to existing solutions being used for threat data exchange between them. The programme also collects sector metadata, so that all organisations within these can benefit from the centralised intelligence.

Enhancing application penetration test findings
Specialist application security penetration testing firm Cherak Industries Pte Ltd works primarily for financial services companies in the banking and insurance sectors, and is looking to expand its business throughout Asia. Cherak has some innovative pen test result reporting systems which integrate with client software fault and vulnerability tracking systems, and it actively looks for methods to provide additional value to its clients. Cherak has identified that pen test clients would benefit from help to in understanding the effects of combinations of vulnerabilities, especially design flaws, and has decided to utilise the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook to define and explain the automation-related threats. The individual vulnerabilities were scored as normal using CVSSv2 and v3, the matching CWEs identified, and mitigations in place documented. In addition, Cherak uses the threat events defined in the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook to help create a new section in the executive summary that explains how combinations of the issues found could lead to automation threats and the possible technical and business impacts. For example, an assessment for one client had identified weaknesses in authentication so that there is a risk of OAT-008 Credential Stuffing. The defined identifier was provided to the client, so its technical staff could refer to additional information on the OWASP website.

Specifying service acquisition needs
Falstone Paradise Inc is concerned about malicious use of their portfolio of hotel and resort websites. The majority of the websites use a shared application platform, but there are some unique applications and a large number of other micro-sites, some of which use generic content management systems such as Wordpress and Drupal. Falstone Paradise has identified that its IT operations team are spending too much time dealing with the effects of automated misuse, such as cleaning up data, resetting customer accounts and providing extra capacity during attacks. Furthermore, the unwanted automation is also causing some instabilities leading to negative feedback from customers. Therefore Falstone Paradise decides to go out to the security marketplace to identify, assess and select products or services that might help address these automation issues for all its websites. Their buying team works with their information technology colleagues to write the detailed requirements in an Invitation to Tender (ITT) document. This describes the types of attacks its web applications are receiving, their frequency of occurrence and their magnitudes. These are defined according to the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook, so that vendors do not misunderstand the requirements, and each vendor's offering can be assessed against the particular automation threat events of concern.

Characterising vendor services
Better Best Ltd has developed an innovative technology to help gaming companies defend against a range of automated threats that can otherwise permit cheating and distortion of the game, leading to disruption for normal players. The solution can be deployed on premises, but is also available in the cloud as a service. But Better Best is finding difficulty explaining its solution in the market place, especially since it does not fit into any conventional product category. Better Best decide to use the terminology and threat events listed in the OWASP Automated Threat Handbook to define their product's capabilities. They hope this will provide some clarity about their offering, and also demonstrate how their product can be used to replace more than one other conventional security device. Additionally, Better Best writes a white paper describing how their product has been successfully used by one of their reference customers Hollybush Challenge Games to protect against OAT-006 Expediting, OAT-005 Scalping, OAT-016 Skewing and OAT-013 Sniping.

=Ontology=

Introduction
The list of threat events and summary descriptions, defined in full in the, is:

Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)


CAPEC is a dictionary and classification taxonomy of known attacks on software. Its primary classification structures are:


 * Domains of attack (3000) - Social Engineering (403), Supply Chain (437), Communications (512), Software (513), Physical Security (514), Hardware (515)
 * Mechanism of Attack (1000) - Gather Information (118), Deplete Resources (119), Injection (152), Deceptive Interactions (156), Manipulate Timing and State (172), Abuse of Functionality (210), Probabilistic Techniques (223), Exploitation of Authentication (225), Exploitation of Authorization (232), Manipulate Data Structures (255), Manipulate Resources (262), Analyze Target (281), Gain Physical Access (436), Malicious Code Execution (525), Alter System Components (526), Manipulate System Users (527)

WASC Threat Classification


The WASC Threat Classification classifies weaknesses and attacks that can lead to the compromise of a website, its data, or its users.

OWASP WASC Web Hacking Incidents Database Project (WHID)
WHID classifies publicly known incidents using:


 * attack methods e.g. ARP spoofing, abuse of functionality, account compromise, administration error, automation, backdoor, banking trojan, brute force, clickjacking, code injection, content injection, content spoofing, credential/session prediction, cross site request forgery (CSRF), cross-site scripting (XSS), denial of service, directory traversal, domain hijacking, DNS hijacking, forceful browsing, HTTP response splitting, hidden parameter manipulation, hosting malicious code, information leakage, insufficient authentication, known vulnerability, local file inclusion (LFI), malvertising, malware, malware injection, mass assignment, misconfiguration, OS commanding, parameter manipulation, path traversal, phishing, predictable resource location, process automation, redirection, remote file inclusion (RFI), rogue 3rd party app, scaping, search engine poisoning, shell injection, social engineering, stolen credentials, SQL injection, unintentional information disclosure, weak password recovery validation, worm
 * weakness e.g. abuse of functionality, application misconfiguration, directory indexing, improper filesystem permissions, improper input handling, improper output handling, information leakage, insecure indexing, insufficient anti-automation, insufficient authentication, insufficient authorization, insufficient entropy, insufficient password recovery, insufficient process validation, insufficient session expiration, insufficient transport layer protection, misconfiguration, predictable resource location, weak password
 * outcome account hijacking, account takeover, botnet participation, chaos, credit card leakage, data loss, defacement, DDoS attacks, DNS hijacking, DNS redirection, disinformation, disclosure only, downtime, extortion, fraud, information warfare, leakage of information, link spam, loss of sales, malware distribution, monetary loss, phishing, planting of malware, service disruption, session hijacking, spam, spam links, stolen credentials, worm

Plus other/various/unknown.

= Bibliography =

The following academic, open source, commercial and news sources were used in the research on automated threats to web applications. OWASP is a worldwide not-for-profit charitable organization focused on improving the security of software. We operate under a vendor neutral policy and we do not endorse products or services.

in E-Commerce Fraud, ThreatMetrix, 2013 http://info.threatmetrix.com/rs/threatmetrix/images/Five_Trends_eCommerce_Fraud_WP.pdf
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 * 2012 Payment Card Threat Report	 https://www.securitymetrics.com/static/resources/orange/2012%20Payment%20Card%20Threat%20Report%20copy.pdf
 * 2014 Bot Traffic Report: Just the Droids You were Looking for	 http://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2014.html
 * 3 Types of ‘Return Fraud’ to Monitor this Holiday Season	 http://www.practicalecommerce.com/articles/3168-3-Types-of-%E2%80%98Return-Fraud-to-Monitor-this-Holiday-Season
 * 7 Ways Bots Hurt Your Website, Distil Networks http://www.distilnetworks.com/7-ways-bots-hurt-website-whitepaper/
 * Abusing HTML 5 Structured Client-side Storage	2008	 http://packetstorm.wowhacker.com/papers/general/html5whitepaper.pdf
 * Acquiring Experience with Ontology and Vocabularies, Walt Melo, Risa Mayan and Jean Stanford, 2011 http://www.omg.org/news/meetings/workshops/SOA-HC/presentations-2011/13_SC-6_Melo_Stanford_Mayan.pdf
 * An Anatomy of a SQL Injection Attack	 Hacker Intelligence Initiative	 Imperva	 	 http://www.imperva.com/docs/HII_An_Anatomy_of_a_SQL_Injection_Attack_SQLi.pdf
 * The Anatomy of Clickbot.A	 https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/hotbots07/tech/full_papers/daswani/daswani.pdf
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 * Anti-Automation Monitoring and Prevention	2015	 https://www.clerkendweller.uk/2015/1/29/AntiAutomation-Monitoring-and-Prevention
 * Anti-DDoS Solution for Internet Corporation	 http://www.nsfocus.com/uploadfile/Solution/NSFOCUS%20Anti-DDoS%20Solution%20for%20Internet%20Corporation.pdf
 * Anti-Fraud Principles and Proposed Taxonomy	 Sep 2014	 http://www.iab.net/media/file/IAB_Anti_Fraud_Principles_and_Taxonomy.pdf
 * Apache Security	 Ivan Ristic
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 * AppSensor, OWASP https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSensor_Project
 * Attack & Defense Labs	 http://www.andlabs.org/html5.html
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 * Attacking with HTML5	2010	 https://media.blackhat.com/bh-ad-10/Kuppan/Blackhat-AD-2010-Kuppan-Attacking-with-HTML5-wp.pdf
 * Automated attacks	 Hacker Intelligence Initiative	 Imperva	 http://www.imperva.com/docs/HII_Automation_of_Attacks.pdf
 * Avoiding the Top 10 Software Security Design Flaws	 http://cybersecurity.ieee.org/images/files/images/pdf/CybersecurityInitiative-online.pdf
 * Bad Bots On The Rise	 Dec 2014	 http://www.darkreading.com/informationweek-home/bad-bots-on-the-rise/d/d-id/1318276
 * Banking Botnets Persist Despite Takedowns, Dell SecureWorks, 2015 http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/banking-botnets-persist-despite-takedowns/
 * The Barracuda Web Application Firewall: XML Firewall	 https://www.barracuda.com/assets/docs/White_Papers/Barracuda_Web_Application_Firewall_WP_XML_Firewall.pdf
 * Blocking Brute Force Attacks	 http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~csadmin/gen_support/brute_force.php
 * Bot Traffic Growing Problem for Digital	 Oct 2014	 http://www.netnewscheck.com/article/36537/bot-traffic-growing-problem-for-digital
 * BotoPedia	 Incapsula	 http://www.botopedia.org/
 * Boy in the Browser	 Imperva	 http://www.imperva.com/DefenseCenter/ThreatAdvisories/Boy_in_the_Browser
 * Business Logic Attacks - Bots and BATs, Eldad Chai, 2009 http://www.owasp.org/images/9/96/AppSecEU09_BusinessLogicAttacks_EldadChai.ppt
 * Bypassing Client Application Protection Techniques	 http://www.securiteam.com/securityreviews/6S0030ABPE.html
 * A CAPTCHA in the Rye	 Hacker Intelligence Initiative	 Imperva	 http://www.imperva.com/docs/HII_a_CAPTCHA_in_the_Rye.pdf
 * Characterizing Large Scale Click fraud	 http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~voelker/pubs/za-ccs14.pdf
 * Charter Addition Proposal: "Trusted Code" for the Web https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webappsec/2015Mar/0150.html
 * A cheesy Apache / IIS DoS vuln (+a question) 	 http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/456339/30/0/threaded
 * China's Man-on-the-Side Attack on GitHub http://www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2015-03&post=China%27s-Man-on-the-Side-Attack-on-GitHub
 * The CISO Survey and Report, OWASP, 2013 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/File:Owasp-ciso-report-2013-1.0.pdf
 * Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC), Mitre https://capec.mitre.org/
 * Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing the Impact	 CERT-UK	 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/400106/Common_Cyber_Attacks-Reducing_The_Impact.pdf
 * Corporate espionage – the internet’s new growth industry	 http://www.itproportal.com/2015/03/19/corporate-espionage-internets-new-growth-industry/
 * CSA Top Threats to Cloud Computing	 https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/topthreats/csathreats.v1.0.pdf
 * CSRF vulnerability in GMail service	 http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Mar/29
 * CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors, 2011 http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/
 * Cyber Fraud - Tactics	 Techniques and Procedures	 http://www.crcpress.com/product/isbn/9781420091274
 * Cybercrime Report: Q1 2015, ThreatMetrix, 2015 http://info.threatmetrix.com/WP-2015Q1CybercrimeReport_WP-LP.html
 * Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), 2014	 http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014/
 * Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), 2015 http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/
 * Data Breaches Fuel Login Attacks	 Akamai	 Feb 2015	 http://www.stateoftheinternet.com/downloads/pdfs/2014-state-of-the-internet-threat-advisory-public-data-breaches-fuel-login-attacks.pdf
 * Data Scraping	 Wikipedia	 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_scraping
 * DDoS Quick Guide	 https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DDoS%20Quick%20Guide.pdf
 * DDoS Threat Landscape Report, 2013-2014 http://lp.incapsula.com/rs/incapsulainc/images/2013-14_ddos_threat_landscape.pdf
 * Defending Against an Internet-based Attack on the Physical World http://avirubin.com/scripted.attacks.pdf
 * Defending Against Application-Based DDoS Attacks with the Barracuda Web Application Firewall	 https://www.barracuda.com/assets/docs/White_Papers/Barracuda_Web_Application_Firewall_WP_Defending%20_Against_%20Application-Based_%20DDoS_%20Attacks.pdf
 * Demystifying HTML 5 Attacks	 http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/demystifying-html-5-attacks/
 * Denial of Service Attacks: A Comprehensive Guide to Trends	 Techniques	 and Technologies	 Hacker Intelligence Initiative	 Imperva	 http://www.imperva.com/docs/HII_Denial_of_Service_Attacks-Trends_Techniques_and_Technologies.pdf
 * Detecting and Blocking Site Scraping Attacks	 Imperva	 http://www.imperva.com/docs/WP_Detecting_and_Blocking_Site_Scraping_Attacks.pdf
 * Detecting Automation of Twitter Accounts: Are you a human	 cyborg	 or a bot?	 http://www.cs.wm.edu/~hnw/paper/tdsc12b.pdf
 * Detecting Malice	 Robert "RSnake" Hansen	2009	 http://www.detectmalice.com/
 * Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) 	 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1414072277428&uri=CELEX:32002L0058
 * Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 	 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046
 * Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Cyber-Attacks	 Risk Mitigation	 and Additional Resources	 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council	 http://www.ffiec.gov/press/PDF/FFIEC%20DDoS%20Joint%20Statement.pdf
 * Do Evil - The Business of Social Media Bots	 Forbes	 http://www.forbes.com/sites/lutzfinger/2015/02/17/do-evil-the-business-of-social-media-bots/
 * DoS and DDoS Glossary of Terms	 prolexic	 http://www.prolexic.com/knowledge-center-dos-and-ddos-glossary.html#layer-7-ddos-attack
 * E-commerce Malware	 Trustwave	 https://gsr.trustwave.com/topics/placeholder-topic/e-commerce-malware/
 * Exploiting Software, G. Hoglund and G. McGraw, Addison-Wesley, 2004
 * Five Trends to Track
 * Hacker builds cheatbot for hit app Trivia Crack http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/03/26/hacker_builds_trivia_crack_cheat_app/
 * How to Defend Against DDoS Attacks - Strategies for the Network	 Transport	 and Application Layers	 Prolexic	 http://www.prolexic.com/kcresources/white-paper/strategies-for-the-network-transport-and-application-layers-412/Strategies_for_the_Network_Transport_and_Application_Layers_Prolexic_White_Paper_A4_082412.pdf
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 * How to Shop for Free Online - Security Analysis of Cashier-as-a-Service Based Web Stores	 http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/145858/caas-oakland-final.pdf
 * HTML5 Overview	 A look at HTML5 Attack Scenarios	 Trend Micro	2011	 http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/reports/rpt_html5-attack-scenarios.pdf
 * HTML5 Top 10 Threats Stealth Attacks and Silent Exploits	2012	 https://media.blackhat.com/bh-eu-12/shah/bh-eu-12-Shah_HTML5_Top_10-WP.pdf
 * HTML5 web security	2011	 http://media.hacking-lab.com/hlnews/HTML5_Web_Security_v1.0.pdf
 * HTTPPOST - Slow POST	 Wong Onn Chee	 OWASP AppSec DC 2010	 https://www.owasp.org/images/4/43/Layer_7_DDOS.pdf
 * If you've got @British_Airways account may make sense to change your password. Just had all my Avios cleared out! https://twitter.com/suttonnick/status/581556027948195840/photo/1
 * Internet Security Threat Report, Volume 19, 2014 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-istr_main_report_v19_21291018.en-us.pdf
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 * Joomla Reflection DDoS-for-Hire	 Akamai	 Feb 2015	 http://www.stateoftheinternet.com/downloads/pdfs/2015-state-of-the-internet-threat-advisory-joomla-reflection-attack-ddos-for-hire.pdf
 * Layer 7 DDOS – Blocking HTTP Flood Attacks	 http://blog.sucuri.net/2014/02/layer-7-ddos-blocking-http-flood-attacks.html
 * Lenovo	 Superfish put smut on my system' – class-action lawsuit	 The Register	 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/23/lenovo_superfish_class_action_lawsuit/
 * List of Attack Vectors  Relative Vulnerability Rating TECAPI http://www.tecapi.com/public/relative-vulnerability-rating-gui.jsp#
 * Man in the Browser	 http://scisweb.ulster.ac.uk/~kevin/IJACI-Vol4No1-maninbrowser.pdf
 * Man in the Browser Attack	 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Man-in-the-browser_attack
 * Mapping and Measuring Cybercrime, Oxford Internet Institute http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/publications/FD18.pdf
 * Massive Changes in the Criminal Landscape	 Europol	2015	 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/massive-changes-criminal-landscape
 * Matching Attack Patterns to Security Vulnerabilities in Software-Intensive System Designs http://collaboration.csc.ncsu.edu/laurie/Papers/ICSE_Final_MCG_LW.pdf
 * Mitigating DDoS Attacks with F5 Technology	 F5	 https://f5.com/resources/white-papers/mitigating-ddos-attacks-with-f5-technology
 * Mitigating the DoS/DDosS Threat, Radware, 2012 http://www.radware.com/PleaseRegister.aspx?returnUrl=6442452061
 * Modern Web Attacks, Sophos, 2007 http://www.sophos.com/en-us/why-sophos/our-people/technical-papers/modern-web-attacks.aspx
 * ModSecurity Advanced Topic of the Week: Mitigating Slow HTTP DoS Attacks	 https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/(Updated)-ModSecurity-Advanced-Topic-of-the-Week--Mitigating-Slow-HTTP-DoS-Attacks/
 * Most common attacks on web applications https://ipsec.pl/web-application-security/most-common-attacks-web-applications.html
 * New Wave of DDoS Attacks Launched	 BankInfoSecurity.com	 Mar 2013	 http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/new-wave-ddos-attacks-launched-a-5584/op-1
 * NOMAD: Toward Non-Invasive Moving Target Defense Against Web Bots	 http://faculty.cs.tamu.edu/guofei/paper/NOMAD_CNS13.pdf
 * Online Ad Fraud Exposed: Advertisers Losing $6.3 Billion To $10 Billion Per Year	 Sep 2014	 http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/threat-intelligence/online-ad-fraud-exposed-advertisers-losing-$63-billion-to-$10-billion-per-year/d/d-id/1317979
 * Online Data Companies versus Bots: The Fight is on for Control of Online Data, Distil Networks http://www.distilnetworks.com/online-data-companies-vs-bots-download/
 * Optimal Airline Ticket Purchasing Using Automated User-Guided Feature Selection	 http://ijcai.org/papers13/Papers/IJCAI13-032.pdf
 * Payment Checkout Flaws and Bugs	2014	 https://www.clerkendweller.uk/2014/11/4/Payment-Checkout-Flaws-and-Bugs
 * PCI Compliance Report 2015	 Verizon	 http://www.verizonenterprise.com/pcireport/2015/
 * Pixel Perfect Timing Attacks with HTML5	2013	 http://www.contextis.com/services/research/white-papers/pixel-perfect-timing-attacks-html5/
 * Polymorphism as a Defense for Automated Attack of Websites	 http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-319-07536-5_30
 * Preventing Web Scraping: Best Practice 	 https://creativedigitalideas.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/best-practice-to-prevent-web-scraping.pdf
 * Profile: Automated Credit Card Fraud	 http://old.honeynet.org/papers/profiles/cc-fraud.pdf
 * Protecting Against Web Floods, Radware http://www.radware.com/PleaseRegister.aspx?returnUrl=6442452968
 * Q4 2014 State of the Internet Security Report	 prolexic	 http://www.stateoftheinternet.com/downloads/pdfs/2014-internet-security-report-q4.pdf
 * Reflection injection	 http://cybersecurity.ieee.org/images/files/images/pdf/CybersecurityInitiative-online.pdf
 * A Report on taxonomy and evaluation of existing inventories, ENISAhttp://ecrime-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/E-Crime-Deliverable-2-1-20141128_FINAL.pdf
 * Reporting Intellectual Property Crime: A Guide for Victims of Copyright Infringement, Trademark Counterfeiting, and Trade Secret Theft, Dept of Justice http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ip-victim-guide-and-checklist-march-2013.pdf
 * SANS Top 20 Critical Controls	 https://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/
 * Securing Websites, Sophos, 2011 http://www.sophos.com/en-us/why-sophos/our-people/technical-papers/securing-websites.aspx
 * Security Insights: Defending Against Automated Threats	 http://www.securityweek.com/security-insights-defending-against-automated-threats
 * Server side DDoS	 Imperva	 http://www.imperva.com/DefenseCenter/ThreatAdvisories/DDOS_Attack_Method_Payload_05182010
 * Slow Read Denial of Service attack	 https://code.google.com/p/slowhttptest/wiki/SlowReadTest
 * Slow-Read DoS Attack	 https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/ModSecurity-Advanced-Topic-of-the-Week--Mitigation-of--Slow-Read--Denial-of-Service-Attack/
 * Slowloris HTTP DoS	 http://ha.ckers.org/slowloris/
 * So what are the "most critical" application flaws? On new OWASP Top 10 https://ipsec.pl/application-security/2013/so-what-are-most-critical-application-flaws-new-owasp-top-10.html
 * Social Media Bots Offer Phony Friends and Real Profit	 NY Times	 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/fashion/social-media-bots-offer-phony-friends-and-real-profit.html?_r=1
 * Software Vulnerability Analysis, Krsul, 1998 http://www.krsul.org/ivan/articles/main.pdf
 * Sophos Security Threat Report	 http://blogs.sophos.com/2014/12/11/our-top-10-predictions-for-security-threats-in-2015-and-beyond/
 * SpoofedMe Social Login Attack Discovered by IBM X-Force Researchers http://securityintelligence.com/spoofedme-social-login-attack-discovered-by-ibm-x-force-researchers/#.VSuiEhPSngM
 * State of Software Security Report, Volume 5, Veracode, 2013 https://info.veracode.com/state-of-software-security-report-volume5.html
 * Stopping Automated Attack Tools	 http://www.technicalinfo.net/papers/StoppingAutomatedAttackTools.html
 * Taxonomy on Online Game Security http://www.math.snu.ac.kr/~jhcheon/publications/2004/Taxonomy%20on%20online%20game%20security_EL.pdf
 * A Taxonomy of Computer Program Security Flaws, with Examples, Landwehr https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/ATaxonomyofComputerProgramSecurityFlawswithExamples%5BLandwehr93%5D.pdf
 * A Taxonomy of Security Faults in the UNIX Operating System, Aslam, 1995 https://cwe.mitre.org/documents/sources/ATaxonomyofSecurityFaultsintheUNIXOperatingSystem%5BAslam95%5D.pdf
 * Testing Guide, v4, OWASP, 2014 https://www.owasp.org/images/5/52/OWASP_Testing_Guide_v4.pdf
 * The Bot Baseline: Fraud in Digital Advertising	 https://s3.amazonaws.com/whiteops-public/WO-ANA-Baseline-Study-of-Bot-Fraud.pdf
 * The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (iOCTA) 2014	 https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/internet-organised-crime-threat-assesment-iocta
 * The Notorious Nine	 Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2013	 CSA	 https://downloads.cloudsecurityalliance.org/initiatives/top_threats/The_Notorious_Nine_Cloud_Computing_Top_Threats_in_2013.pdf
 * The Risks of Content Management Systems, IBM, 2015 https://portal.sec.ibm.com/mss/html/en_US/support_resources/pdf/CMS_Threats_MSS_Threat_Report.pdf
 * The Spy in the Sandbox – Practical Cache Attacks in Javascript http://iss.oy.ne.ro/SpyInTheSandbox.pdf
 * Thousands of Hacked Uber Accounts Selling on Dark Web for $1 http://thehackernews.com/2015/03/thousands-of-hacked-uber-accounts_30.html?m=1
 * Threat Intelligence Quarterly, IBM, 1Q 2015 https://www.ibm.com/services/forms/signup.do?source=swg-WW_Security_Organic&S_PKG=ov33510&S_TACT=C327017W&dynform=18101
 * Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, Adam Shostack, Wiley, April 2014 http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1118809998.html
 * Threats and Mitigations: A Guide to Multi-Layered Web Security - eBook	 Prolexic	 	 http://www.prolexic.com/knowledge-center/prolexic-download/guide-multi-layered-web-security-ebook.pdf
 * Trapping Unknown Malware in a Context Web, Sophos http://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical%20papers/HuqSzabo-VB2013.pdf?la=en.pdf
 * Trustwave Global Security Report	2014	 https://www2.trustwave.com/GSR2014.html?utm_source=redirect&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=GSR2014
 * TurboTax’s Anti-Fraud Efforts Under Scrutiny	 http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/02/turbotaxs-anti-fraud-efforts-under-scrutiny/
 * Two Security Vulnerabilities in the Spring Framework’s MVC pdf (from 2008)	 http://blog.diniscruz.com/2011/07/two-security-vulnerabilities-in-spring.html
 * The Underground Economy of Spam: A Botmaster’s Perspective of Coordinating Large-Scale Spam Campaigns	 http://static.usenix.org/events/leet11/tech/full_papers/Stone-Gross.pdf
 * Understanding Web Bots and How They Hurt Your Business	 Encapsula	 http://www.slideshare.net/Incapsula/understanding-web-bots-and-how-they-hurt-your-business
 * Use of A Taxonomy of Security Faults, Taimur Aslam, Ivan Krsul and Eugene H Spafford, 1996 http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2304&context=cstech
 * The WASC Threat Classification v2.0	 http://projects.webappsec.org/w/page/13246978/Threat%20Classification
 * Warhol Worms: The Potential for Very Fast Internet Plagues http://www.iwar.org.uk/comsec/resources/worms/warhol-worm.htm
 * Web Application Attack Report #5	 Imperva	 http://www.imperva.com/docs/HII_Web_Application_Attack_Report_Ed5.pdf
 * Web Application Defender's Cookbook: Battling Hackers and Protecting Users, Ryan Barnett, Wiley, December 2012 http://eu.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-1118362187.html
 * Web Attacks in the Wild	 Corsaire	 https://www.owasp.org/images/a/a7/Web_attacks_in_the_wild_-_ap.pdf
 * Web Automation	 Friend or Foe?	 https://www.owasp.org/images/5/58/OWASP_Israel_-_May_2009_-_Ofer_Shezaf_-_Automation_Attacks.pdf
 * Web Spambot Detection Based on Web Navigation Behaviour 	 http://pedramhayati.com/papers/Web_Spambot_Detection_Based_on_Web_Usage_Behaviour.pdf
 * Website Security Statistics Report, 2014 http://info.whitehatsec.com/rs/whitehatsecurity/images/statsreport2014-20140410.pdf
 * What is Zeus?	 http://www.sophos.com/medialibrary/pdfs/technical%20papers/sophos%20what%20is%20zeus%20tp.pdf
 * When Web 2.0 Attacks! Understanding Ajax	 Flash and other highly interactive web technologies…	 https://www.owasp.org/images/f/fc/When_Web_2.0_Attacks_-_Understanding_Security_Implications_of_Highly_Interactive_Technologies-Rafal_Los.pdf
 * Where have all of our Passwords Gone?	 Gartner	2015	 http://blogs.gartner.com/avivah-litan/2015/01/22/where-have-all-our-passwords-gone/
 * WS-Attacks.org	 http://www.ws-attacks.org/index.php/Main_Page

=FAQs=

This page is in the process of creation


 * How do you define "web", "application" and "automated threat"?
 * See the definitions in the project's.


 * What is an "ontology"?
 * An ontology is a set of types, properties, and relationship. These together define a subject description language. This particular ontology is meant to represent what automated threats real world owners observe affecting their web applications in usual operations.


 * Isn't this another bug (vulnerability) list?
 * Answer


 * I thought "XYZ" already did that?
 * Answer


 * How can I help?
 * Answer

= Acknowledgements =

Contributors
[mailto:colin.watson@owasp.org Colin Watson]

Jason Chan

Mark Hall

Andrew van der Stock

Additionally other professional colleagues and website owners and operators who provided feedback.

= Road Map and Getting Involved =

Can you help? The project is looking for information on the prevalence and types of automated threats seen by web application owners in the real world. This will be used to refine and organise the information gathered from research papers, whitepapers, security reports and industry news. Please use the project's mailing lists to keep up-to-date with what's going on, and to contribute your ideas, feedback, and experience:


 * Mailing list

To share information confidentially, you can email the project leader directly: [mailto:colin.watson@owasp.org Colin Watson].

Completed Outputs

 * A summary chart has been published summarising the information gathered and work to date
 * Identifying automated threats to web applications, and determining the primary name used. This first part of the project intends to produce a consistent vocabulary for discussing the threats before moving onto other aspects
 * The primary terms have now been defined and described for the ontology
 * A briefing document was produced in May 2015
 * Release Automated Threat Handbook July 2015
 * Release project overview flyer July 2015
 * Release Automated Threat Handbook July 2015
 * Release project overview flyer July 2015

Roadmap
The project's roadmap was updated in June 2015.

Q1 2015

 * Feb 2015: Define scope and terminology Done
 * Mar 2015: Research prior work and reports about automated threats to web applications to create bibliography Done

Q2 2015

 * Apr 2015: Assess threats/attacks and create ontology Done
 * Apr 2015: Application owner interviews and creation of initial project outputs, to refine model Done
 * May 2015: Publication of outputs and request for review/data Done
 * May 2015: Summit session and survey at AppSec EU Done
 * Jun 2015 Review Done
 * Jun 2015 Write ontology document Done
 * Jun Write 2-page project briefing Done
 * Jun Publish project briefing Done
 * Jul 2015: Publish v1.0 ontology Done

Q3 2015

 * Jul-Sep 2015: Gathering of additional contributions, updates to outputs, and translations.